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Abstract 
 
Dealing with increasing foreign debt has become a key part of government strategy across the de-
veloping world, particularly in wake of the payment crises that have shaken south-east Asia, Latin 
America, Turkey and Russia over the past decade. This working paper seeks to analyze how the 
political systems in these countries have adapted to the grave problems created by unpayable debt, 
examining in the process the structure of modern global finance, the history of the state in the de-
veloping world, and the demands placed upon governments by sudden rises in poverty and general 
economic turmoil. Focusing on case-studies of Argentina, Indonesia and Zambia, the paper un-
picks the dynamics of these crises, suggesting that certain states have managed to strengthen their 
freedom of action and authority by recasting their relations with the public at home and with fo-
reign lenders. 
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Resumen 
 
La gestión de la deuda externa se ha convertido en una pieza fundamental de las estrategias guber-
namentales en todo el mundo en desarrollo, sobre todo tras las crisis de pago que han sacudido el 
Sudeste asiático, Latinoamérica, Turquía y Rusia a lo largo de la última década. Este documento de 
trabajo busca analizar la forma en que los sistemas políticos de estos países se han adaptado a los 
graves problemas provocados por las deudas impagables, examinando en el proceso la estructura 
del actual régimen financiero mundial, la historia del Estado en el mundo en desarrollo, y las nue-
vas demandas impuestas sobre los gobiernos, derivadas de los aumentos bruscos de la pobreza y la 
turbulencia económica general. Por medio de tres casos prácticos, de Argentina, Indonesia y Zam-
bia, este documento de trabajo busca descifrar la dinámica de aquellas crisis, y sugiere que ciertos 
Estados han logrado reforzar su libertad de acción y su autoridad por medio de una refundación de 
sus relaciones con la ciudadanía y con los acreedores extranjeros. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The world economy, and with it the economic 
health of most developing countries, appeared 
to many commentators at the start of 2006 to 
be in the midst of a benign period, marked by 
stable growth, low inflation and minimal inte-
rest rates1. Compared to the financial crises 
and volatility that characterized much of the 
previous ten years across large parts of the 
world - particularly in South-East Asia, Latin 
America and Russia - this panorama of stable 
and growing developing nations has undoub-
tedly come as a welcome surprise. 
 
For the fact remains that foreign debt, and eco-
nomic collapse caused by failure to honour re-
payments of debt, has become one of the defi-
ning features of relations between the develo-
ped and the developing world in the past three 
decades. Almost all major lower-middle and 
middle income developing nations – including 
Mexico, Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, Argentina, 
Thailand and Turkey – have been directly 
affected, suffering periods of crisis and steep 
economic decline as a result of public or priva-
te sector default on their debt servicing; in so-
me cases, notably that of Brazil in 1999 and 
2002, the mere threat of impending national 
bankruptcy has been enough to spur a major 
programme of structural adjustment and fiscal 
austerity.  
 
Meanwhile, many of the least developed na-
tions have accumulated financial obligations 
far beyond their budgetary capacities, genera-
ting a chronic malaise in these countries’ na-
tional accounts and stalling concerted efforts 
to reduce their steep poverty rates. The Hea-
vily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program-
me, introduced in 1996 by the leading interna-
tional financial organizations and since exten-
ded to 40 countries (33 of them in sub-Saha-
ran Africa), is currently the principal global ef-
fort to remedy this problem2. Debt burdens in 
these nations, however, remain significant im-
pediments to development. 
 
Studies of these phenomena are plentiful, and 
much has been written about the nature of fi-
nancial market volatility and treatment of risk, 
                                                          
1 See “In the best of times, it is prudent to ponder the worst”, by 
Kenneth Rogoff, Financial Times, 3/01/2006. 
2 The goal of the HIPC is to reduce debt stocks in these coun-
tries to $90.6 billion, approximately two-thirds of their current 
level (Jubilee, 2003; p. 7). As of 2005, 19 countries had reached 
the so-called Completion Point, making them eligible for uncon-
ditional debt relief of $37 billion. 
the effects of structural adjustment program-
mes and the socio-economic consequences of 
debt crises. In the field of political economy, 
there is also a general consensus that contem-
porary international lending and indebtedness 
broadly conform to a general principle of glo-
balisation: namely, that greater intensity and 
volume of international economic linkages, in 
this case those based around the capital ac-
count, reduce the freedom of decision of na-
tion-states, above all those in the developing 
world. The key idea here is that sovereignty in 
the developing world is being undermined by 
dependence on private sector creditors and bo-
dies such as the International Monetary Fund, 
which is taken to represent the interests of the 
global economic order. 
 
This thesis appears intuitively to be right, and 
there is little doubt – as this paper will argue – 
that the HIPC countries have been exposed to 
just such a model of sovereignty loss. Yet in 
numerous cases, the crises generated by de-
fault have also led to processes of political and 
social change that do not entirely conform to 
such a model: Argentina, to take the most re-
cent example, has undergone a profound poli-
tical convulsion since its financial collapse in 
December 2001, and has engaged in an on-
going feud with the IMF and holders of its 
treasury bonds; following its crisis in early 
2001, Turkey has elected a moderate Islamic 
government, and combined fiscal austerity 
with an increasingly heterodox foreign policy; 
and most notably, Brazil in October 2002 
elected a left-wing president, despite months 
of market-led concern over the effects that a 
Workers’ Party administration would entail. 
 
In each of these cases, there is also clear evi-
dence that the debt crisis limited governmental 
freedom of action, often through the letters of 
intent – incurring pledges of public fiscal sur-
pluses - that the countries were obliged to sign 
with the IMF. But it is precisely the contra-
dictory and complex nature of the responses 
offered by democratic polities in these major 
developing nations to their debt crises that will 
be the object of this study. Far from confor-
ming to creditors’ expectations, these coun-
tries have embarked on periods of political 
transition and reconfiguration that question 
previous models of ties with the North, pre-
vious understanding of democratic politics, 
and previous models of socio-economic deve-
lopment; the outcome of these processes may 
as yet be uncertain, but this paper will seek to 
decipher the dynamics of change, and the way 
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in which debt has prompted these transfor-
mations. 
 
Furthermore, all the economies that were hit 
by apparently devastating financial crises from 
the late 1990s onwards are currently (in early 
2006) enjoying robust growth, against a back-
drop of stability and expanding investment. 
South-East Asia’s major economies, for instan-
ce, have recorded their third year of expan-
sion3, whereas Turkey, Argentina and Brazil 
are all in the midst of a prolonged period of 
growth, and are enjoying a huge increase in 
the value of their exports. Part of the reason 
for this turnaround is undoubtedly a favoura-
ble international environment, marked by high 
commodity prices (above all oil) and low inte-
rest rates. Yet at the same time, the new politi-
cal forces that have taken power in these na-
tions have proved extremely cautious in taking 
on new debt - both Argentina and Brazil have 
paid off their IMF debts in their entirety -, 
while also seeking to preserve underlying ma-
croeconomic stability through low inflation 
and controlled government expenditure. 
 
This paper will begin by briefly examining the 
international financial context that has given 
rise to widespread chronic indebtedness, the 
volatility with which global markets treat ma-
jor borrowing nations, and the domestic policy 
conditions needed for a country to open its 
borders to free private capital flows, and there-
by debt. Attention will then be focused on the 
characteristics of states in developing world, 
giving rise to a typology of state-systems, with 
case studies of countries (Indonesia, Argentina 
and Zambia) that fall in each of the categories 
discussed. Chapters 3, 4 & 5 represent the co-
re of this paper, containing a critical study of 
the social effects of debt on these nations, the 
political and diplomatic impact of debt crises, 
and the factors which weaken or reinforce de-
mocracy, state capacity and sovereignty as a 
result. A final analysis will seek to establish a 
broad model of these effects and incorporate 
them into an interpretation of global systems 
of power, which are seen as responding in a 
contradictory fashion to debt crises, and see-
king to resolve these contradictions through 
the agency of the nation-state, even as this is 
struggling to reassert its legitimate authority. 
 
At present, the eventual implications of the 
debt crises and burdens existing across the de-
veloping world are unknown, but there seems 
                                                          
3 “All serene”, The Economist, 25/02/2006. 
little doubt that the vast popular traumas 
which have afflicted countries such as Argenti-
na, Indonesia and Zambia will shape their so-
cieties and politics for decades to come. By 
studying the dynamics of this process and its 
consequences for the state, this paper also ho-
pes to reach a clearer understanding of the in-
ternational community’s power structure in an 
era of global economic integration, and to ex-
plain how its management of foreign debt in 
the developing world reveals a wealth of con-
tradictory values and impulses, which together 
place burdens, at times impossible, on the sole 
body that can claim to answer to the will of the 
people. 
 
 
 
2. Global finance and the 
nature of modern foreign debt 
 
The foreign debt owed by developing nations 
has grown steeply in the past four decades, to 
the extent that in 2003 it represented 37.5 per-
cent of the total GDP of the developing world4. 
Its growth, however, has neither been uniform 
in nature nor even in distribution. Any under-
standing of how certain developing countries 
stand exposed to threats of debt default must 
start with a clear view of where the debt bur-
den is currently allocated, and how it compa-
res with the potential for economic stability 
and development (and therefore reliable debt 
servicing) in the regions that are most indeb-
ted. 
 
Total outstanding foreign debt from the 
world’s developing nations has risen from just 
over $2 trillion in 1995 to stand in 2003 at 
2,554 billion dollars. Two regions in particular 
claim shares of this debt that are far greater 
than their proportion of developing world 
GDP: Latin America and the Caribbean, with 
779.6 billion dollars of debt in 2003 (32.7 per-
cent of the total debt; 39.8 percent of regional 
GDP), and sub-Saharan Africa, with 231.4 bil-
lion dollars (9.0 percent of total debt; 67.1 per-
cent of regional GDP). Compared to its weigh-
ting in terms of both population and economic 
activity, on the other hand, Asia’s share of the 
debt (including that of India and China) is 
modest, at only 707 billion dollars (27.57 per-
cent of the total). The one clear exception in 
that region is Indonesia, with total liabilities 
standing at 134.4 billion dollars (50.9 percent 
                                                          
4 Based on figures in Global Development Finance 2005. 
  6
of its GDP)5. 
 
Two dynamics in particular have contributed 
to the disproportionately high debt levels in 
Latin America and Africa: in the former, as in 
much of Asia, the main increases in credit ha-
ve come from private sector lenders, firstly 
through bank loans to states in the 1970s, and 
since then primarily via investment in govern-
ment bonds, credits to the private sector and 
portfolio investment, which are thereafter tra-
ded in financial markets. Potential growth ra-
tes in emerging markets, being considerably 
higher than those experienced in industriali-
zed countries, have been the principal magnet 
for such capital, which has sought a maximum 
return on initial investment; according to the 
economist Chesnais, the rate of return expec-
ted by capital brokers on their investments un-
derwent a sizeable increase in the early 1990s, 
to end at 15 percent (Chesnais & Plihon, 
2003; p. 7), coinciding with a boom in private 
capital flows to the developing world. 
 
In Africa, on the other hand, most of the debt 
increase is the result of bilateral and multilate-
ral loans, which together represented 76 per-
cent of the continent’s long-term debt in 
19986. The accumulation of this official debt – 
which is far beyond the servicing capacity of 
many states – has emerged from a variety of 
causes, most notably the declining prices of 
raw materials, a history of domestic corruption 
and poor debt management, and the extreme 
over-confidence in export diversification and a 
recovery in commodity prices displayed by the 
main creditors; one IMF study reported that 
the credit extended to Zambia in 1983 assu-
med a four-year 45 percent increase in the va-
lue of its main export commodity, copper, 
when in fact this fell in price by 12 percent7. 
 
The claims of creditors over various nations’ fi-
nancial resources, and the need for these na-
tions to attract foreign funds to cover their 
spending requirements, have assumed a diplo-
matic and political importance in keeping with 
the dimensions of foreign debt. Mexico’s poli-
tical trajectory since its default on $80 billion 
in public sector debt in August 1982 – a com-
plete abandonment of import substitution in 
favour of full integration in the global econo-
                                                          
5  Figures from Global Development Finance 2005. 
6  Africa in World Politics: State System in Flux, p. 63, ed Har-
beson J. W. & Rothchild D., 2000. 
7  External Debt Histories of Ten Low-Income Developing Coun-
tries, p. 8, Policy Development and Review Department, IMF, 
1998. 
my – provided one early instance of these ef-
fects. Although it was not by any means the 
first bankruptcy of its kind8, the Mexican de-
fault served to illustrate how a financial crisis 
might influence the strategic outlook of a ma-
jor developing nation. Yet it also gave a first 
insight, which has since been repeated in nu-
merous other cases, into the structural dyna-
mics of power that underlie the provision and 
repayment of international credit. 
 
 
2.1. POWER MECHANISMS IN THE MODERN 
INTERNATIONAL DEBT REGIME 
 
Indebtedness implies a relationship in which 
one party, the creditor, has a claim over part of 
the assets or income of the debtor. Under the 
rule of law within a modern nation-state, this 
claim is in the last instance arbitrated by a do-
mestic authority - the judicial system - which 
can impose punishments on any debtor who 
refuses to pay. This threat of sanctions is im-
plicit in the normal workings of any credit 
market in the developed world. 
 
One critical characteristic of the modern inter-
national debt regime is the lack of such a ver-
tical mechanism of authority: according to one 
former director of IMF research, “by their very 
nature, sovereign debt contracts are not enfor-
ceable in the same way that corporate debts 
contracts usually are”9. Attempts to intervene 
in a country by force so that unpaid debts can 
be exacted are extremely rare, though both 
France and Britain in the 19th century strove to 
do so by taking over ports, seizing assets and 
running customs offices of other countries 
(Egypt by Britain, Turkey by France)10. Ins-
tead, continuous financial flows to and from 
the developing world are dependent on a sys-
tem of incentives and sanctions that comply 
with two essential functions: they must be re-
garded by creditors as sufficient to ensure the 
steady receipt of future repayments (and there-
by a healthy return on capital), and by debtors 
as less onerous that the complete absence of 
fresh credit. In the absence of either of these 
conditions, international financial flows will 
cease. 
                                                          
8  France is reported to have ceased payments on its debt on ave-
rage once every 30 years from the 1500s to the 1800s. Global 
Development Finance 2003, p. 56. 
9  Rogoff K., “Emerging Market Debt. What is the Problem?”, 
speech to Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism Conference, 
2003. 
10  The United States intervened for similar reasons in the Domi-
nican Republic, Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua. See Global De-
velopment Finance 2003; p. 57. 
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Recent efforts to regulate these relations wit-
hin a body of international law – notably 
through Collective Action Clauses in bond is-
sues and a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Me-
chanism11 – would certainly provide some or-
der to these relations, and could in principle 
extend the remit of international law to a de-
faulted nation’s assets; attempts by bond-hol-
ders to seize Argentina’s foreign property follo-
wing the unilateral moratorium declared by 
that country’s government in January 2002 ha-
ve already registered some legal victories12. It 
nevertheless remains the case that ongoing 
consent by both parties to the norms of credit 
and repayment is essential for international fi-
nancial relations to remain in place, and that 
the principal disincentive to default is not di-
rect punishment, but ostracism from future 
credit lines or the global economic order; in 
January 2004, only Somalia, Iraq, Liberia, Su-
dan and Zimbabwe were in arrears on their 
debt obligations to the IMF13, a step regarded 
in financial circles as the principal benchmark 
of a nation’s financial exile. 
 
A second key characteristic of the debt regime, 
however, is shared in both national and inter-
national financial markets. Heavily concentra-
ted debt imperils both repayment by the deb-
tor and the institution that provided the credit: 
this is best summed up in an old maxim, “if 
you owe a bank a hundred pounds, you have a 
problem, but if you owe it a million, it has”14. 
The threat posed by a major international de-
fault to overexposed financial institutions was 
fully evident in the Mexican debt crisis of 
1982, when the world banking system was 
rendered de facto insolvent. More recently, the 
highly concentrated exposure of the IMF to 
major developing nations – the five largest bo-
rrowers in 2003 (Brazil, Turkey, Argentina, In-
donesia and Russia, in descending order) re-
presented 87 percent of all IMF credit – em-
phasized just how important the constant flow 
of debt servicing is to the Fund’s fiscal sustai-
nability and investment grade15. 
 
Negotiations between the Argentine govern-
ment and international financial organizations 
(primarily the IMF) in the period from Decem-
ber 2001 to the first agreement of September 
                                                          
11 Ibid, pp. 63-68. 
12 “Por la deuda, inhiben bienes del Estado argentino en EE. 
UU.,” Clarín, 6/2/2004. 
13 Financial Risk in the Fund and the Level of Precautionary Ba-
lances, p. 18, IMF Finance Department, 2004. 
14 “The IMF should stand firm against Argentine blackmail,” 
Martin Wolf, Financial Times 28/01/2004. 
15  Financial Risk in the Fund, p. 21. 
2003, and then through a number of reviews, 
have repeatedly been influenced by the Fund’s 
perceptions of the possible damage to its fi-
nances from an Argentine default – and of 
course by tactical use by Argentina of this 
threat. It is notable in this respect that the 
2003 agreement, which effectively rolled over 
the country’s repayment on debt principals 
(though not interest) for two years, was only 
sealed once the Argentine government had joi-
ned the list of countries in arrears with the 
Fund, albeit for a period of only two days16. 
 
These two key characteristics of relations bet-
ween states, markets and official lending bo-
dies within the international debt regime have 
very many different consequences, depending 
on the particular circumstances of the players 
involved and the influence that can be exerted 
on other investors’ perceptions: a multilateral 
loan to a single-export country in Africa, for 
instance, generally has more binding power 
over the debtor than a bond purchase in an in-
ternational market from a major emerging eco-
nomy. The uncertainty that these conditions 
generate over whether future repayments will 
materialize is translated by lending institutions 
and financial markets into calculations of risk. 
This “risk factor,” which simply means the 
danger that a country’s government (or leading 
businesses) will fail or refuse to honour their 
foreign debts, can then be computed into the 
loan’s initial conditions. Risk, in other words, 
is assumed by the creditors in return for hig-
her rates of return on investment17. 
 
Markets and investors have a vested interest in 
reducing the possibility of a default while ma-
ximising the return on capital: their logic is 
therefore to seek out high-growth developing 
economies and open these economies to free 
capital movements, while of course insulating 
their loans against default. Yet given the struc-
tural features of international debt discussed 
above, it is clear that both direct political inter-
                                                          
16 Argentina failed to repay 2.09 billion in SDRs on September 9, 
2003, but cleared its obligations on September 11, 2003. The 
country also went into arrears with the World Bank on October 
15, 2002, before repaying $795.5 million in January 2003. Ibid, 
p. 22. 
17 A host of consultancies now work in field of risk calculation, 
examining both economic and political conditions. One survey 
by the Eurasia Group, published in the Financial Times 
5/2/2004 (“Index puts price on political risk”) revealed that of 
23 emerging market economies, Nigeria, Azerbaijan, Colombia, 
Indonesia and Venezuela have the lowest political stability, and 
Hungary, South Korea, Poland, Mexico and Thailand the 
highest. According to the group’s head, Ian Bremmer, “an emer-
ging market country is a country where politics matter at least as 
much as economics. It is vital to ask whether state leaders have 
the willingness and political capital to pay”.  
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vention or effective judicial arbitration are 
unavailable as means to ensure the continued 
servicing of debts. The alternative, embraced 
by the leading world economies since the 
1980s, is to sponsor and promote internal 
change: this is indeed the third main characte-
ristic of the debt regime.  
 
Without any legitimate multilateral financial 
bodies able to enforce their rulings, lending 
bodies, both private and public, have sought to 
shape indebted countries in the image they de-
sire – as reliable and transparent debt payers. 
Loan conditionality has proved one vital sour-
ce of leverage for the IMF and World Bank sin-
ce the 1980s; for private lenders, the transla-
tion of markets’ risk perceptions into higher 
interest rates on loans or falling exchange rates 
represent the most important levers over a 
country’s domestic policies. The aim, in short, 
is to ensure that these markets converge with 
those of the developed world. 
 
The merits of such convergence are hotly con-
tested (see Stiglitz, 2002; Feldstein, 2002). Po-
werful nations, and the international bodies 
they dominate, are accused of imposing 
through conditionality a host of financial re-
forms – notably free capital access, entry of fo-
reign banks and structural changes to the state 
– that are too premature for countries’ levels of 
development, undermine vital public institu-
tions and expose these economies to extremely 
hazardous levels of volatility. Recent pre-elec-
toral market turbulence in Turkey and Brazil 
has also pointed to how markets in supposedly 
“converged” countries have established direct 
mechanisms for expressing political disappro-
val (or rather, to use the correct financial ter-
minology, for investors to express aversion to 
potential risk).  
 
Without wishing to enter further into a debate 
that is rich in literature and controversy, it 
should be pointed out that convergence, as 
seen through the eyes of creditors, is a means 
of correcting the defects of the state in the de-
veloping world. As a result, it tends to treat the 
state as a single, indivisible entity, whose poli-
cies can be gauged in quality by the yardstick 
of convergence to a desired norm (Dollar 
2001). In parallel, politicians and officials in 
developing countries have often sought to 
bolster their reputation for creditworthiness in 
international markets by conforming as cons-
picuously as possible to the criteria set by the 
markets. Santiso (2004; p. 20) terms the who-
lesale adoption of liberalization policies in cer-
tain countries in the 1990s as a means to secu-
re “strategic labels, bringing visibility in the 
large landscape of populous emerging mar-
kets”. 
 
States in developing countries, however, do 
not conform to such a straightforward model: 
they are contested sites, are plagued by inter-
nal divisions, and limited in influence by a 
host of rival powers (business, media, civil so-
ciety). The financial policies they espouse, the-
refore, are only sustainable within a wider po-
litical context that favours their adoption and 
implementation. For the markets, on the other 
hand, a changed context (including a demo-
cratic election result) represents “risk”; social 
and political evolution in any particular coun-
try is thus not seen as having any intrinsic me-
rit insofar as it does not lead to the desired 
market convergence. As we shall see, this view 
of the state in the developing world has very 
important consequences. 
 
 
 
2.2. EXPLAINING MARKET VOLATILITY IN 
MODERN DEBT CRISES 
 
The spate of debt crises in the developing 
world, and particularly those afflicting Asian 
countries from 1997 to 1998, has underlined 
the extreme volatility of financial markets in 
the wake of the abolition of capital controls. 
Feldstein identifies three factors as underlying 
the crises of the 1990s, which he regarded as 
categorically distinct to the national insolven-
cies of the 1980s: “a combination of unsustai-
nable current account deficits, excessive short-
term foreign debts, and weak domestic ban-
king systems” (Feldstein, 2002; p. 4). The two 
latter characteristics arose largely from the 
overly rapid opening of the country’s financial 
system and capital account to foreign interests, 
whereas the former (which triggered the run 
on the bhat in Thailand) was the result of a fi-
xed and overvalued exchange rate. Mass sel-
ling of the bhat, of course, prompted the even-
tual devaluation in July 1997, and the wave of 
devaluations and defaults that later affected 
the whole of South-East Asia, particularly In-
donesia. 
 
In this case – and in others – the importance of 
market perceptions of future circumstances 
(notably the ability to recoup debts and invest-
ments) has proved crucial. The Mexican de-
fault of 1982 bore little resemblance to this 
situation: the government announced that it 
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could no longer pay its debts in the light of 
recent hikes in the US interest rates, a decision 
that was not brokered by any market interme-
diary. But the transition in debt financing du-
ring the past two decades from bank loans to 
the bond market, and the opening of develo-
ping countries to free capital movements, has 
enabled market activity to arrogate power over 
two monetary mechanisms that are central to a 
nation’s economic stability and insertion in the 
world economy: these are the exchange rate, 
and the interest rate on foreign debt (known as 
the country spread on US treasury bonds, or 
the “risk premium”)18. 
 
Exchange rates are critical to the stability of a 
country’s trade pattern and the ease or difficul-
ty with which it services foreign debt, much or 
all of which is denominated in foreign curren-
cies (above all the dollar)19. Sudden falls in the 
exchange rate, as experienced by the Brazilian 
real in mid-2002, frequently precede debt cri-
ses, whereas feverish speculation against the fi-
xed exchange rate served to topple the curren-
cy peg and generate wider economic collapse 
in Mexico, Thailand, Argentina and Indonesia 
(where the currency, the rupiah, operated on a 
“pegged crawl” against the dollar). In the case 
of Argentina, fears over imminent default and 
devaluation caused a massive capital flight of 
$18 billion from March to November 2001, at 
the end of which Economy Minister Domingo 
Cavallo declared the infamous “corralito” on 
bank withdrawals – the pretext to the vast 
social uprising in Buenos Aires in December 
2001. 
 
The interest rate imposed on new bond issues, 
for its part, determines just how expensive it 
will be for a state or private enterprise to refi-
nance its foreign debts: the Argentine capital 
flight mentioned above, for instance, was ac-
companied by a sharp rise in the spread on 
new bonds, forcing the government to accept 
larger repayments over time in a context of in-
cessantly declining revenue20. Lurches in the 
domestic interest rate, meanwhile, are normal-
ly intended to defend an imperilled exchange 
rate, often at the cost of domestic economic 
                                                          
18  The Economist, “Survey on Global Finance,“ 1/5/2003. 
19 “97 percent of all debt placed in international markets 
between 1999 and 2001 was denominated in just five currencies: 
the US dollar, the euro, the yen, the pound sterling and the 
Swiss franc. Even well-run emerging economies, such as Chile, 
cannot borrow in their own currencies.” Martin Wolf in the Fi-
nancial Times, 4/8/2004. Economist Ricardo Hausman has des-
cribed this inability to borrow in one one’s own currency as 
“original sin”. 
20  The so-called megacanje (mega-swap), which restructured 
private debt worth $55 billion in late 2001. 
malaise. Economic activity during the first 
year of President Luiz Inacio de Silva’s admi-
nistration, for example, was seriously hampe-
red by real interest rates of over 13 percent, 
derived from the efforts to shore up the Bra-
zilian capital account during the election year 
crisis21. 
 
The effects of these fluctuations on a thriving 
economy may not prove too harmful. Yet one 
of the chief characteristics of the international 
debt regime in the past decade has been the 
manner in which markets have served to ac-
centuate the economic conditions in a given 
debtor country, either by inflating a boom, or 
more seriously, by worsening a recession. Al-
though in principle debt financing should 
smoothe out a nation’s economic cycle, inter-
national markets - which obviously seek the 
highest return possible on their capital invest-
ment - will tend to lend to countries that are 
growing fast, while seeking to recoup invest-
ments when those same countries enter a 
slump or a recession. As a result, the changes 
mentioned above in interest or exchange rates 
will tend to arrive at the most sensitive mo-
ment for these economies, as the Global De-
velopment Finance report for 2003 states: 
“When macroeconomic conditions move 
against the country, debt markets rightly factor 
in more risk and thus end up charging more 
for debt capital. The result is increased strain 
on the country, and a greater likelihood of 
crisis and default” (World Bank 2003; p. 11). 
 
Thus the interlocking effects of exchange rate 
and interest rate fluctuations, especially when 
they act upon economies that are either in re-
cession or afflicted by structural defects, are 
crucial to the propagation of grave systemic 
crises – the type suffered most notably by In-
donesia and Argentina. At a certain stage, 
Krugman and Obstfeld (2000; p. 706) argue, 
three separate crises will conjoin to devas-
tating effect: a debt crisis in the public and/or 
private sector; a balance of payments crisis; 
and a crisis in the banking system. This “tri-
plication”, which is mediated by the two rates, 
lends itself naturally to a social and political 
convulsion, given the general menace posed to 
people’s jobs, wages and savings. 
 
 
 
                                                          
21  “Lula’s 100 days,” Financial Times, 8/4/2003. 
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2.3. MARKET “IMPERFECTION” OR THE 
PRICE OF PREMATURE LIBERALIZATION? 
 
Despite general consensus around this account 
of how global market mechanisms instigate 
crises, very different interpretations are given 
as to what motivates the volatility of finance to 
the developing world, and how excessive len-
ding can transform so rapidly into a total loss 
of a confidence.  
 
One school of thought, dominant in the in-
vestment community, emphasizes that exces-
sive borrowing and lending in a boom period – 
the Java Stock Exchange in Indonesia, for 
example, grew from $2 billion in 1990 to $117 
billion in 1997 (O’Rourke, 2002; p. 24) – re-
sults from imperfections in the international 
capital market (Kaji, 2001.; pp 573-574). Of 
these, the two most important are the infor-
mation asymmetry existing between creditors 
and debtors, and the “moral hazard” represen-
ted by the prospect of a bailout from interna-
tional lending agencies or friendly govern-
ments22. The conclusion of this thesis is that 
only convergence with international financial 
standards by emerging markets - largely 
through increasing transparency and creating 
stricter obligations to repay debt - can sustain 
stable credit flows. One example of such a re-
form would be Collective Action Clauses in 
bond issues, which are expected to reward re-
liable debtors while raising the cost of borro-
wing for countries with higher risk levels, thus 
eradicating irrational credit booms (Eichen-
green, Kletzer & Mody, 2003; p. 40). It is also 
argued that mandatory collective action by 
bondholders would result in swifter action 
over defaults (Kletzer, 2003; p. 21). 
 
Yet these reforms would not necessarily tame 
the exuberance and panic that have tended to 
characterize the financial markets’ relations 
with the developing world. Low transactions 
costs in money markets, and the vital role in 
these markets of expectations over future va-
lues (meaning the fear of crisis often generates 
panic selling, thus becoming a self-fulfilling 
prophecy), have combined all too often, con-
verting these ill-grounded financial booms into 
rapid collapse. In this respect, many commen-
tators have focused not so much on the imper-
fections in the market that supposedly gene-
rate excessive lending, but the socio-cultural 
dynamics of boom and bust that are intrinsic 
                                                          
22  The Mexican bailout of 1995 was said by orthodox econo-
mists to have accentuated “moral hazard.” 
to global financial market activity.  
 
According to this account, extending the reach 
of the market to key economic variables in de-
veloping countries only serves to impose this 
intrinsic volatility - created by profit-driven, 
interconnected and extremely mimetic mar-
kets, all working on the basis of real-time in-
formation flows23 - onto countries with fragile 
institutions, shallow markets and poorly deve-
loped financial systems. “Financial specula-
tion,” writes Gilpin, “is a herd phenomenon in 
which the seemingly rational action of many 
individuals leads to irrational outcomes” (Gil-
pin, 2000. p. 139).  
 
When this “herd” then pulls out of the em-
bryonic capital markets of developing coun-
tries – fearing a currency collapse or mass debt 
default - the damage done has arguably no re-
lation to the real defects of the economy in 
question. Jeffrey Sachs, Barry Eichengreen and 
many other economists have insisted that the 
South-East Asian economies were fundamen-
tally sound at the time of their crises, and in-
deed the problems faced by all the crisis-hit 
states in1997-8 bore little relations to their key 
variables. South Korea, for example, received a 
huge subsidized loan of $57 from the IMF to 
pay off its private sector creditors, even though 
its total foreign debt stood at only one third of 
GDP (Feldstein, 2002; p. 21). 
 
As a result, these interpretations are much mo-
re critical of the vested interests of western ca-
pital markets – and particularly US Treasury 
polices in the 1990s – for seeking to open up 
markets that were not yet ready for such a le-
vel of global integration, and which were as a 
result exposed to severe shocks24. A more gra-
dual approach, following the models of Chile 
and Malaysia in their timely use of capital con-
trols25, is therefore recommended. Secondly, 
this point of view suggests that international 
creditors and developing nations should make 
much better use of financial tools that do not 
threaten sudden exogenous shocks (often cau-
sed by exchange rate flux), or which discon-
nect debt servicing requirements from the eco-
                                                          
23 “Information and rumours, interconnected in continuous 
flows, are disseminated at high speeds, generating mimetic com-
portments where to imitate ‘the other’ becomes imperative to 
staying in the game,” Santiso 2004; p. 13. 
24  “The evidence suggests that [financial] volatility not only cau-
ses bigger ups and downs in output and incomes, it also causes 
lower average incomes over time.” The Economist: Survey on 
Global Finance, 1/5/2003. 
25  Malaysia imposed controls in 1998. Chile dismantled them in 
2002 after reaching a free trade agreement with the United Sta-
tes. 
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nomic reality of a given country: the World 
Bank has itself posited local currency bonds, 
project bonds, and bonds linked to a country’s 
economic growth and competitiveness as more 
suitable mechanisms for stabilizing financial 
relations between developing countries and 
global markets (World Bank, 2003; p. 43). 
 
The recommendations cited above, however, 
remain largely in their infancy. Collective Ac-
tions Clauses, for instance, received the bac-
king of the International Monetary and Finan-
cial Committee in 2003, and have since been 
introduced by Mexico, Brazil, South Africa and 
Korea in recent bond issues (Eichengreen, 
Kletzer & Mody, 2003; p. 4). Progress is some-
what less apparent in the use of country-sen-
sitive credit mechanisms. Recent local curren-
cy bonds in Brazil, India, Korea and Turkey 
have tended to be short term in comparison 
with bond issues in foreign currencies (World 
Bank, 2003. p. 55), whereas the growth-linked 
bond – proposed by the Argentine government 
in the IMF summit in Dubai of September 
2003 as one of the options for holders of de-
faulted bonds – has yet to make any significant 
headway. Even so, the past few years do ap-
pear to have brought greater caution in both 
the provision of credit and in states’ willing-
ness to take on new debt: according to the 
World Bank (2005; p. 6), “international capital 
markets today are more attuned to, and more 
discriminating about, development finance 
than in the past”. 
 
 
 
2.4. COMPENSATING FOR UNCERTAINTY: 
THE “BUILT-IN” DEBT CRISIS 
 
In these circumstances, therefore, low enfor-
ceability, shared risk and pressures to conver-
gence have formed the basic conditions of po-
wer and influence within the international 
debt regime. Lenders to the public or private 
sector in the developing world have responded 
by protecting their future revenue streams in 
the most straightforward means available: the 
threat of rapid and comprehensive punish-
ment. “In the absence of better institutions and 
enforceable rights,” argues Rogoff (2003; p. 2), 
“the high cost of debt crises equilibrates emer-
ging market countries’ thirst for debt flows and 
investors’ reluctance to lend. By making de-
faults extremely costly, risky forms of debt – 
particularly those that are prone to collective 
action problems – provide a measure of confi-
dence to international investors.” This state-
ment, made by the former head of research of 
the IMF, is extraordinarily revealing; it admits 
that deep and lasting debt crises are the one 
condition on which private lending to the de-
veloping world has been rendered possible. 
Rapid market-led collapse in developing coun-
tries is thus the natural and approved con-
dition for international financing, as can by 
seen in Asia, Argentina and Brazil. “In other 
words,” continues Rogoff, “default costs provi-
de a punishment that in some sense substitutes 
for effective property rights at the international 
level”26. 
 
What is missing from Rogoff’s analysis – and 
which is rightly stressed by recent critics of 
market euphoria – is the international distri-
bution of power that results from this reliance 
on the threat of crisis. Rather than establishing 
fluent and stable financial relations, this sys-
tem makes the perceptions and requirements 
of international lenders absolutely central to 
the demands made on indebted developing 
countries. On one level, this leads to constant 
calls by the investment community and the 
IMF for internal market reforms, which in ma-
ny cases have no bearing on the actual econo-
mic problems of the countries involved (Sti-
glitz, 2002; p. 40). On another, it exposes the-
se countries to much greater financial de-
mands whenever an global economic down-
turn enhances major investors’ perceptions of 
risk: “the problem with over reliance on debt 
financing for development is that the down-
side to adverse global developments has to be 
borne completely by developing countries: 
they must either pay in full or default” (World 
Bank, 2003; p. 11). In this respect, the net out-
flows of capital from Latin America to private 
sector creditors in recent years - $24.8 billion 
in the 2001 and $8 billion in 2002 – prove the 
point argued above that money markets, via 
their capacity to determine exchange rates, in-
terest rates and the prospect of default, accen-
tuated an already existing regional recession, 
and far from correcting the economic cycle, in 
fact worsened it27. 
 
 
 
                                                          
26  One estimate holds that currency and balance of payments 
crisis over the 1975-1997 period reduced output on average by 
between 5 and 8 percent (World Bank, 2003, p. 67). 
27 The obvious counterpoint to this is that countries are allowed 
and positively encouraged to over-borrow during times of do-
mestic boom and high global liquidity (Lavagna in Álvarez (ed.), 
2003; p. 12). The author adds that this surfeit of money serves 
to distort economic policy during the boom, and finance unsus-
tainable “macroeconomic fantasies.” 
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2.5. THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIMENSION 
 
The unwelcome consequences of any failure to 
honour debts imposes tight discipline on the 
government of a developing nation. Later 
chapters will explore the inevitable social and 
political turbulence caused by a debt crisis, 
and particularly by the sort of “triplicated” cri-
sis discussed above; it is obvious that the legi-
timacy of the regime which has accumulated 
debt, and relied on credit for the sustainability 
of its economic policies, is gravely endangered 
by such a crisis. According to Diamond (1998; 
p. 34), the particular combination of economic 
crisis and perceptions of corruption causes the 
most serious erosion of any government’s legi-
timacy. Needless to say, few such administra-
tions, either in democracies or dictatorships, 
survive intact. 
 
In the context of a possible crisis, incumbent 
administrations will tend to act in their own 
political interests, and do their utmost to pre-
vent a debt default, a major devaluation or any 
other shock to macroeconomic stability. The 
heavily indebted administration or regime in 
question will tend to have had a thirst for capi-
tal (either for public finances or for regime-
friendly private corporations), and have tied 
its survival to the sustainability of debt servi-
cing, repeatedly disavowing any possible chan-
ge in course: the most dramatic recent mani-
festation of this tendency came in December 
2001, when the IMF’s refusal to provide fresh 
credit to Argentina28 prompted Economy Mi-
nister Domingo Cavallo to file a new budget 
for the next year, in which cuts of around $9 
billion (or close to 20 percent of total public 
spending) would be made. Given conditions of 
recession, high unemployment, falling real wa-
ges, and the freeze on bank account withdra-
wals, there were few beyond Cavallo and Presi-
dent Fernando de la Rúa who regarded the 
plan as remotely feasible; indeed it seemed to 
most a scenario worse than default. 
 
It is at the stage of impending crisis that the 
configuration of a country’s political leader-
ship comes to the fore. Pressure on the admi-
nistration to reorient its economic policy or at 
least change its leaders become more strident 
(notably from business, the media and popular 
protest), causing markets’ fears of collapse to 
intensify, and eventually provoking a radical 
                                                          
28  An understandable decision given that $8 billion had been 
handed over by the Fund in August, only to finance capital 
flight and withdrawals by large creditors. 
change in government: in the case of Argen-
tina, the resignation of the president provided 
the pretext for default and devaluation; in In-
donesia, Suharto’s fall prompted a sudden 
eruption of popular democracy, and a power 
vacuum; in Zambia, and under very different 
circumstances, official debt demands caused a 
radical shift in the policy of the self-same go-
vernment, headed in 1987 by Kenneth Kaun-
da, until he was eventually thrown out of po-
wer in 1991. 
 
 
 
2.6. THE POLICY “TRILEMMA”: 
ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND THE STATE 
 
At the heart of any possible reorientation in 
policy - which is required to contain the syste-
mic shock across the economy – is the bind of 
global economic integration. The “golden rule” 
determines that a country cannot have free ca-
pital flows, domestic monetary autonomy and 
fixed exchange rates all at the same time; at 
most it can have two of the three (Krugman & 
Obstfeld, 2000; Kaji, 2001, p. 572; Gilpin, 
2000, p. 112). Given that free capital flows and 
fixed or partially fixed exchanges rates29 were 
the operating norms of international finance 
for many developing countries in the 1980s 
and 1990s, it is evident that domestic moneta-
ry autonomy – control over the money supply 
and interest rates– was sacrificed by many 
countries in that period, and handed to the in-
ternational market.  
 
Indeed monetary policy, as prescribed by the 
IMF and financial investors in recent crises, 
has tended invariably towards an emphasis on 
securing returns to capital and holding up the 
exchange rate; one highly disputed aspect of 
IMF policy in Asia, for instance, was the 
implementation of a contractionary policy of 
high interest rates (over 20 percent in Korea 
and other countries) and steep budget cuts. As 
in Argentina, policies designed to stimulate 
domestic growth were neglected in favour of 
efforts to meet the requirements of free capital 
flows at a stable rate of exchange. In the words 
of Paul Krugman in November 2001, “Argen-
tine officials are crucifying their long-suffering 
nation on a cross of dollars”30. 
 
                                                          
29  There is no explicit IMF advice on the choice of exchange rate 
systems, but tacit support was given to certain countries’ fixed 
rates through regular bail-outs aiming to sustain currency levels, 
eg that to Argentina in August 2001 (Feldstein, 2002; p. 8). 
30  “A Cross of Dollars,” New York Times, 7/11/2001. 
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There were notable exceptions to this rule. 
Malaysia stands out for its decision, fiercely 
opposed by the IMF, to implement capital con-
trols when it was hit by the Asian crisis. Strict 
capital controls were in place in China, and are 
only now being softened. Floating exchange 
rates in several Latin American nations –cur-
rencies fell in 2001 in Chile, Paraguay, Uru-
guay and Brazil- enabled these countries to 
withstand some of the worst effects of the glo-
bal recession and the ensuing “contagion” 
from Argentina. The current popularity of floa-
ting rates in the developing world would in-
deed suggest this means of adjusting to exoge-
nous shock is now regarded as the most effec-
tive of the three policy options (economists 
traditionally regard this as a preference for 
competitiveness over long-term macroecono-
mic stability (Frieden & Stein, 2001; p. 9). 
 
Discussion of this policy bind in purely econo-
mic terms, however, fails to shed light on the 
domestic political depth of the choices being 
made. There are, for a start, interest groups 
with clear stakes in the outcome of such a po-
licy choice: “on distributional grounds trada-
bles producers will prefer a depreciated, floa-
ting rate, while those heavily engaged in cross-
border activities, such as finance, commerce, 
and foreign debtors, will prefer a fixed rate” 
(Frieden & Stein, 2001; p. 6). Outside these 
profit-seeking sectors, the state’s choice of mo-
netary policy might seem to have less direct re-
levance or interest. But its tangible implica-
tions for foreign trade, inflation, money supply 
and interest rates means that the policy choice 
made by a government invariably intersects 
with a host of urgent political and social con-
cerns. The actual nature of the monetary di-
lemma may not be understood by the general 
public, yet the preferences each of the three 
policy options expresses over numerous issues 
–liberalization, global integration, credit ac-
cess, public spending, inflation, interest rates – 
are often central to the political climate in a 
developing country, and readily interact with 
other currents of belief to form coherent ideo-
logies, movements and party political support 
networks31. 
 
Furthermore, sudden transitions in the choice 
of policy will tend to coincide with major po-
litical changes, as new forces seek to alter the 
structure of internal and external relations in-
herited from a previous, disgraced administra-
                                                          
31  The radical CTA union in Argentina, for instance, placed 
capital controls among its chief economic demands in 2002. 
tion. In this process, free capital flows, mone-
tary autonomy and fixed exchange rate come 
to assume significant political meanings 
through their multiple connections with issues 
as tangible and electorally significant as regime 
corruption, national identity, class rivalry and 
globalization. 
 
Examples of precisely this transition from eco-
nomic policy choice to public political slogan 
are numerous. “From outside they accepted 
the idea that Argentines should earn 100 or 
150 dollars a month,” declared Cavallo in 
2003 in reference to the IMF’s final refusal to 
support the peso two years before, “they deva-
lued the aspirations of the Argentines”32. His 
message was in many ways reflected by Carlos 
Menem, whose failed election campaign in 
2003 appeared to augur an appreciation in the 
peso and possibly a renewed dollar peg. In In-
donesia, meanwhile, the unpayable foreign 
debts of the private sector became synony-
mous with the despised rent-seeking of Suhar-
to’s clan, called the Cendana after the street in 
which they all lived. Foreign business, on the 
other hand, was demanding a rise in the ru-
piah to escape worse punishment: “Should In-
donesia be able to remain within the global 
capitalist system, global prices will have to ri-
se” (Forrester, 1999; p. 125). 
 
This political depth in the choices surrounding 
monetary policy and global financial integra-
tion is matched by their influence on state au-
thority and sovereignty. Sovereignty, as we 
shall see later, can be defined in terms of the 
relations of a nation-state to other states, or by 
the legitimacy and effectiveness of its domestic 
authority. In international terms, a debt crisis 
subjects the state to the pressures exerted by 
major financial institutions, multilateral len-
ding agencies and other interested govern-
ments33.  At the very same time, the socio-eco-
nomic and political turbulence within the na-
tion will tend to make the state subject to an 
uncertain and unfolding scenario (a power 
vacuum), undermine the legitimacy of public 
institutions, and even render parts of the na-
tional territory outside the complete control of 
the state. Between the two sets of pressures, 
the state must seek to remould its authority 
and sustain its autonomy, without which an 
                                                          
32  Speech by Domingo Cavallo on 11/12/2003 to conference at 
the Real Instituto Elcano, “La seguridad jurídica y las inversio-
nes extranjeras en América Latina”. 
33  In the case of Argentina, one such government is that of Italy, 
which has sought to defend the interests of its 400,000 owners 
of defaulted bonds. 
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end to the underlying economic crisis is incon-
ceivable. The obstacles to achieving this, and 
the possibility of reaching a new equilibrium 
at the level of the state, are the concerns of the 
rest of this paper. 
 
 
 
 
3. Debt and the state in the 
developing world 
 
The historical European model of gradual state 
formation – an evolution starting from despo-
tic power and ending in an almost complete 
penetration of society and public institutions – 
is not one that developing states have had the 
time or even inclination to follow. Argentina, a 
quasi-colony even after the declaration of inde-
pendence (Hobsbawn, 1994; p. 357), Indone-
sia and Zambia all received states grafted from 
Europe, overruling territories that had little 
previous geographic or cultural identity. The 
peculiarity of the post-colonial state has per-
haps never been more evident than in Indone-
sia34, which contains 220 million people and 
18,000 islands, and which has been the site of 
several separatist movements (in East Timor, 
Aceh and Irian Jaya).  
 
 
Yet it has been the state, first as the leading 
economic protagonist of development (often 
via a strategy of import substitution), and later 
as the guarantor of security and order for a 
thriving private sector, which has often assu-
med prime responsibility for the welfare of the 
developing nation. When successful, as in 
much of South-East Asia, it has been instru-
mental to growth and development; when a 
failure, it has often blocked growth, increased 
poverty, and destroyed faith in public institu-
tions. 
 
 
Post-colonial states have generally inherited 
poor, largely rural, pre-industrial nations – 
lands over which they sometimes had little 
control. Their initial priorities were economic 
development and the realization of national 
self-determination, strategic goals that were in-
terpreted according to rival doctrines, political 
cultures and diplomatic aspirations: thus arose 
                                                          
34  Post-colonial Pakistan is possibly a more extreme case, com-
prising two territories separated by the breadth of India. The in-
dependence of Bangladesh in 1971 brought the experiment to an 
end. 
the variety of democracies, dictatorships, plan-
ned economies and unregulated markets that 
have characterised the developing world. A 
certain convergence toward free-market, elec-
toral democracy does indeed appear to hold 
beyond a certain level of development, as Fu-
kuyama (1991) postulated: one survey revea-
led that of 141 countries between 1950 and 
1990, no democracy was subverted in any na-
tions where per capita income was higher than 
$6,000 - the figure for Argentina in 1975 
(Przeworski et al., 2000; p. 98). Before that le-
vel, however, the forms of state, its democratic 
credentials, and its ability to stimulate econo-
mic growth are highly variable, and prone to 
sudden shifts in fashion. 
 
 
Yet the alternatives of democracy or dictator-
ship are far from being the only ways to cha-
racterise and categorize any given state in the 
developing world: there is no doubt that the 
development strategy embraced by democratic 
states in Botswana and Mauritius can be more 
fruitfully compared with recent dictatorships 
in South Korea and Indonesia than with the 
policies implemented in Jamaica or Venezuela 
– both of them long-standing democracies 
(Leftwich, 2000; p. 133). Furthermore, as ex-
perts in democracy have observed, it is noto-
riously hard to make general distinctions bet-
ween the economic performance (rather than 
economic status) of democracies and dictator-
ships: observed rates of growth in poor demo-
cracies and dictatorships are virtually identi-
cal, although growth under dictatorships does 
tend to be much more variable (Przeworski et 
al, 2000; p. 143-144). 
 
 
In other words, when considering the broad 
developmental impact of a state – and obvious-
ly the effects it has on its citizens’ or subjects’ 
welfare – a rather larger set of concepts must 
be employed in order to gain deeper under-
standing of the ways in which states configure 
their relations with civil society, their standing 
in the international community, and their abi-
lity to realize the developmental goals they ha-
ve set for themselves. Although, as we shall see 
later, the division between democracies and 
dictatorships is itself of great significance, two 
additional variables are required in order to 
analyse the functions and capacity of the state 
in the developing world: these are legitimacy 
and autonomy. 
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3.1. A TYPOLOGY OF THE STATE 
 
Broadly speaking, three forms of state have do-
minated the post-war developing world, each 
one seeking out a particular equilibrium bet-
ween democracy, state prerogative and econo-
mic development.  
 
The developmental state has aimed to bring 
about rapid modernization of the nation’s eco-
nomy through central planning and targeted 
stimulation of business activity. This need not 
mean that the state is a dictatorship: of the 
eight high-growth developing countries listed 
by Leftwich (2000; p. 169), three could be 
counted as democracies (Botswana, Singapore 
and Malaysia). Yet many rulers and political 
scientists, concerned by the transitional distur-
bances posed by rapid growth (above all urba-
nization, industrialization and secularisation), 
have maintained that a dictatorship had cer-
tain merits in managing a fast development 
process. “Political disorder is not produced by 
the absence of modernity, but the efforts to 
achieve it,” wrote Huntingdon (1968; p. 48), 
and fears over the civil and political strife that 
democracy would allegedly entail in such un-
stable circumstances – especially in the con-
text of the Cold War - were used to justify de-
cisions to “postpone” disruptive elections, 
emasculate legislatures, and prevent the 
growth of rival political parties with access to 
the general public. On many occasions, the de-
velopment state was thus ruled by a commu-
nist or military vanguard, each armed with an 
ideology that served to stress the importance 
of collective or national integrity over demo-
cratic “divisiveness”. 
 
A prime example of such a regime is Indone-
sia, led from 1965 to 1998 by President Suhar-
to. His “new order” sought to bring about vast-
ly improved living standards in the country, 
and was indeed successful in that respect: per 
capita income rose on average 4.8 percent per 
year from 1965 to 1997 (Leftwich, ibid). At 
the heart of this regime was a mixed elite - an 
estimated 1,000 technical experts, high-ran-
king military officers and political intermedia-
ries, who together coordinated development 
and the channels of influence to and from so-
ciety. Such a state, which in the case of Indo-
nesia gave early support to integration into the 
global economy35 (in contrast to many deve-
                                                          
35  Indonesia possessed an open capital regime from 1971, 
though until the 1990s private capital flows were negligible 
(O’Rourke, 2002; p. 24). 
lopmental states in Africa and Latin America), 
is said by political scientists to have a greater 
degree of “autonomy”; its decisions, in other 
words, are not shaped by public pressures, but 
by the necessities of future growth and the re-
quirements of coordinating labour, business 
and public institutions to this end. 
 
Aside from preventing public strife, the absen-
ce of democracy in the development process 
has also been regarded as a means to avoid the 
consensual conservatism that tends to be the 
hallmark of representative government (Left-
wich, 2000; p. 174). It is crucial, however, to 
distinguish between two different sorts of state 
autonomy, each of which has very different ef-
fects on the welfare and development of a na-
tion. One is the autonomy of a despotic state, 
commonly found in pre-industrial nations 
(Weiss & Hobson, 1995; p. 240); the arbitrary 
use of power by such a state might make it fea-
red, but it has few mechanisms to penetrate 
society, reliably extract resources or mobilize 
groups (it is “authoritarian without being au-
thoritative”, as explained by Grindle (1996; p. 
33)). The other is the autonomy of a “strong 
state”, which is able to implement a genuine 
growth strategy by harnessing the activities of 
all sectors in society and relying on wides-
pread legitimacy. Here the autonomy is “em-
bedded”: it needs allies and intermediaries 
across the breadth of society, yet it is able to 
direct their activities and even shape their per-
ceived interests. 
 
The tension between the two forms of autono-
my has been crucial to the long-term success 
or failure of the developmental state. Without 
electoral democracy, legitimacy must be 
sought be other means – most obviously, once 
slogans of national self-defence or popular rule 
have lost their impact36, by rising welfare assu-
red by continuous growth. But in an integrated 
global economy, in which exogenous shocks 
are commonplace, this source of legitimacy 
cannot be guaranteed. The chief mechanism 
through which the state conveys its authority 
to the rest of society hence comes under direct 
threat – as was evident in Indonesia – and the 
state can be drawn from its embedded autono-
my to one of authoritarian rule37. It may there-
                                                          
36  Suharto came to power amid an extremely violent repression 
of the Communist Party (PKI) from 1964-1965. 
37  Suharto’s reaction to the protest movement of early 1998 was 
to revive the Kopkamtib, the secret police that in the repression 
of the 1960s is estimated to have killed 500,000 people. Prior to 
his resignation on May 21, he signed three executive decrees to 
this effect. Of course, the developmental state more commonly 
moves in the opposite direction – towards greater democracy 
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by insulate itself from society, but at great cost 
to its operational capacity. 
 
Furthermore, as Suharto’s demise illustrated, 
developmental states have been plagued by de-
fects generated by their very autonomy: by the 
1990s, the collusion between businesses par-
tially or completely owned by Suharto’s relati-
ves or cronies, economic policy-makers and 
political leaders was complete. One effect of 
this supremely powerful clan network was rent 
-seeking through government licensed and 
subsidized industries, such as that of the clove 
cigarette industry, which was under the con-
trol of the president’s youngest son, or the na-
tional car and aircraft industry (O’Rourke, 
2002; p. 46). Likewise, leading banks and pri-
vate corporations were dominated by regime-
friendly executives, a fact that led to excessive 
lending from the country’s central bank 
(through the so-called Bank Indonesia Liqui-
dity Support) to support them during the cri-
sis; auditors later established that 96 percent of 
this lending was subject to some form of abuse 
(Ibid; p. 61). 
 
It is important in this respect to underline that 
these structural defects did not provoke the 
crisis that engulfed Indonesia from 1997 to 
1998 – contrary to IMF and investment com-
munity arguments at the time. But once the 
crisis had begun, these rentier practices were 
blatantly exposed by the rapidity and scale of 
the financial collapse. In a context of mass im-
poverishment, such widely known abuses ser-
ved only to aggravate the initial loss of legiti-
macy, and turn the state, as run by Suharto, 
into the principle culprit of the crisis in the 
eyes of the Indonesian public. (One recent re-
port has indicated that Suharto left power ha-
ving defrauded Indonesian state coffers of bet-
ween $15 billion and $35 billion dollars, the 
largest state-led embezzlement ever commit-
ted38). 
 
Although clear distinctions in the developing 
world are by no means easy to make, the prin-
cipal rival to the developmental state has been 
what might be termed the corporatist state, of 
which Argentina and several other Latin Ame-
rican nations (Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela) are 
leading examples. In comparison to the initial 
circumstances of developmental states – which 
often arise in rural, pre-industrial nations, 
                                                                                       
(e.g. South Korea). 
38  Figures are from a recent report from the NGO Transparency 
International. See report “Los presidentes ladrones” in El País, 
01/07/2004. 
where civil societies were notoriously weak – 
these states have tended to inherit political 
systems marked by stronger competing secto-
ral interests and class conflict. Unable to stand 
back from society and establish a process of ra-
pid, planned development, the corporatist sta-
te has sought to compensate for its weaknesses 
by reaching pacts with the principal group in-
terests (labour, business, foreign investors, the 
military and the bureaucracy), and thus gua-
rantee its legitimacy through a combination of 
orderly economic growth and controlled parti-
cipation. 
 
One explicit example of such a strategy were 
the national agreements made in Venezuela in 
1958 afters years of civil and political strife: 
one of them, the Worker-Owner Pact, sought 
to assure a greater share for labour in national 
income, in return for popular consent to a ca-
pitalist model of development; the other, Pun-
to Fijo, effectively promised a share of govern-
ment posts and patronage for each of the two 
political parties, regardless of which was the 
electoral victor. Similar traces of economic po-
licy accommodation and political elitism can 
be found in the PRI regime in Mexico, in the 
Liberal and Conservative Party carve-up in Co-
lombia, both military and democratic (Pero-
nist) rule in Argentina, and in the Getulio Var-
gas epoch of military dictatorship in Brazil. In 
essence, the corporatist system these countries 
embraced was designed to appease the main 
organized interest groups through a system of 
rule by political cartel. It is therefore not sur-
prising that the main challenges to any given 
cartel have come from previously unorganized 
interests (the citizenry in Argentina in 2001, 
the urban poor in Venezuela who participated 
in the 1989 “caracazo”), or from organized in-
terests that believe their claims have been un-
fairly neglected (leading to the business-spon-
sored challenge to PRI in Mexico, or the trade 
union-based Workers’ Party in Brazil). 
 
A first important distinction between the ac-
tions of the developmental and the corporatist 
state is derived from this issue of accommo-
dation with social interests, and thus the sta-
tes’ legitimacy. A developmental state tends 
not to pacify any given group interest, but 
either to co-opt it or combat it: Suharto took 
the former option with the political Islam mo-
vements in the 1990s, and the latter with the 
communist uprising of the 1960s. Corporatist 
states, on the other hand, will tend to promote 
political rule based on a coalition of support 
between competing interests. This need for a 
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coalition does not mean that corporatist states 
are synonymous with democracy. Support 
need not always come from the ballot box: in 
most of the Cold War period, the prevalence of 
dictatorships and democracies in Asia and La-
tin America was roughly equal39, and Argenti-
na, though a corporatist state, has spent 39 
years between 1930 and 2006 under military 
rule (the slogan used by the military junta of 
1976 to 1983 was that “the ballot boxes are in 
safe keeping” (Feinmann, 2003; p. 35)). Free 
elections have often been regarded by corpora-
tist regimes as a threat to the established ba-
lance of interests, or “order”. They have been 
held off with appeals to values such as secu-
rity, national integrity or hate for the outsider; 
as a result, the regime pattern has been similar 
to that of developmental states. 
 
But the corporatist state system does differ in 
one key respect with respect to democracy. 
The natural dynamic of a corporatist state is to 
react, and if possible accommodate, the pres-
sures posed by organized groups. Its environ-
ment is one of competing group demands, the 
effect of which is to stimulate the activities of 
civil society, create new political forces, and 
reinforce the clamour for democracy. In the 
end, the exhausted corporatist dictatorship 
usually subsides (such as in Spain, Portugal, 
Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil), and in 
recent years has not been revived40. The deve-
lopmental state, on the other hand, will tend 
to establish highly controlled means of demo-
cratic access, and justify the restrictions on wi-
der participation through ideology and myth; 
its logic is more plainly to create democracy 
on its own preferred terms, and it reverts to 
authoritarian patterns without great hesita-
tion41. 
 
In terms of autonomy – a second main distinc-
tion - the corporatist state is at a clear disad-
vantage. It may seek to work in a coordinating 
capacity between key groups, as in highly in-
dustrialized countries such as Japan (Weiss & 
Hobson, 1995: p. 4), but its own structural 
weaknesses, and the entrenched rivalries bet-
ween social factions, militate against this role. 
                                                          
39  But not entirely. According to the survey by Przeworksi et al 
(2000), over the period 1950 to 1990 democracy has been 12 
percent more likely in Latin America than the average given its 
level of economic development. 
40  And this in spite of widespread economic decline in the late 
1990s and early 21st century. 
41  Vladimir Putin’s Russia may be taken as one example. It re-
mains to be seen whether Indonesia under new president, Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (elected September 2004), a former gene-
ral, reverses democratic gains. 
The impact on economic strategy is profound: 
the developmental state seeks to orientate 
group interests in its economic plans rather 
than appease them, enabling powerful deve-
lopment agencies (the Economic Development 
Board in Singapore, the Ministry of Finance 
and Development Planning in Botswana) to as-
sume strategic control over the economy in 
ways unimaginable in corporatist states. In the 
latter, economic decision-making is decided by 
the ruling coalition to accommodate the grea-
test number of major group interests. The re-
sult, in many corporatist states, is a series of ad 
hoc economic policies, heavily influenced by 
“concentrated” interest groups such as the fi-
nancial sector (Frieden & Martin, 2003; p. 
129), poorly attuned to the long-term develop-
ment of the nation, and prone to irresponsible 
borrowing by the state. 
 
Furthermore, economic policy often becomes 
a driver of political dispute or accommodation, 
and not always to its advantage. In the case of 
Argentina, the coalition around convertibility, 
which in the presidential elections of 1995 and 
1999 assumed the status of an economic un-
touchable, expressed general support for a po-
licy that had apparently eliminated the coun-
try’s nemesis, hyper-inflation. The strategic ef-
fects of the policy, which gravely affected the 
country’s trade patterns and internal markets, 
were simply ignored in the light of convertibi-
lity’s political necessity. 
 
The contrasts between the two sorts of states, 
therefore, can be drawn around the different 
approaches to legitimacy and autonomy. We 
have already seen that legitimacy, especially in 
conditions of economic hardship, is a critical 
dilemma for the developmental state; the more 
successful states of this ilk, such as South Ko-
rea, Japan, Singapore and Malaysia, have made 
equitable distribution a vital part of their deve-
lopmental strategy, and have become progres-
sively more democratic as their income levels 
have advanced. For the corporatist state, on 
the other hand, political legitimacy is more 
readily achieved through the access given to 
key interest groups, and more importantly, by 
democratic elections. Evidence indeed sug-
gests that citizens tend to weigh a political sys-
tem’s legitimacy in terms of its capacity to pro-
vide certain basic political rights, rather than 
its socio-economic results (Diamond, 1998; p. 
16). But the corporatist state lacks autonomy: 
it is often trapped inside the logic of its own 
coalitions, unable to implement desirable (if 
unpopular) policies, unable to extricate itself 
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from crisis. Its basic need is thus to seek out 
new areas of autonomy, where if possible it 
can declare its prerogative over and above the 
claims of competing social groups. 
 
The last and third sort of developing world sta-
te is found in all regions, but prevails like no 
other in sub-Saharan Africa: this is the neo-pa-
trimonial state. Its chief characteristic is one 
that is found in both previous state-types, but 
which in this case is made into operating norm 
– the state, nominally a public institution, is 
annexed by a network of personal interests 
that assume control over state resources, and 
then deploy these to perpetuate the power of 
the ruling clan or network. Real politics, there-
fore, is not concerned with institutionalised 
state activities, but with informal channels of 
patronage and corruption (Chabal & Daloz, 
2000; p. 139); the recurrent state failures, po-
litical instability and chronic debt crisis in 
Africa have been attributed in part to this dis-
tortion of the state into a personal resource. 
 
States of this type have found ideal conditions 
in areas of great poverty, recently free of colo-
nial rule, dominated by rural activity, depen-
dent on a very few staple exports and equipped 
with the most fragile initial state structures. 
The state, in an account given by one eminent 
political scientists (Herbst, 2003), was unable 
before independence to “broadcast power” to 
an entire territory, which has often been filled 
with rival ethnic groups. Since independence, 
possession of the state – providing resources 
from the chief export industries (via owner-
ship and special taxes), along with critical ac-
cess to international recognition and develop-
ment aid – has become a greater priority than 
extending the state’s services to the whole of a 
national territory, despite several valiant exam-
ples to the contrary. 
 
This has had two important consequences for 
many nations’ public debt and expenditure: in 
the first instance, the non-institutional envi-
ronment has been propitious for irresponsible 
borrowing, and the creation of what has been 
termed “odious debt”, most notably in Mobutu 
Sese Seko’s Zaire (1965-1997)42. Secondly, re-
gimes have tended to seek broader political 
support through the coalitions created by in-
formal patronage, and in particular via systems 
of public subsidy that could appeal to broad 
                                                          
42  Transparency International estimates that Mobutu looted $5 
billion (El País, 1/7/2004). The country’s HIPC debt cancellation 
is set to reach $6.3 billion. 
swathes of opinion. In several countries, this 
involved subsidies for basic goods: in the case 
of Zambia, one vital subsidy was that for corn-
meal, or “mealie-meal”, a staple in the national 
diet (Grindle, 1996; p. 32). This subsidy’s par-
ticular target group was urban wage-earners, 
yet its perceived distortion to free market ope-
rations made it the chief part of government 
spending identified for elimination by the 
structural adjustment programme reintrodu-
ced by the World Bank in the 1991. In this ca-
se –as in the Venezuelan “caracazo” of 1989, 
which was sparked by a steep increase in bus 
prices– the regime’s very legitimacy was bound 
up with its ability to preserve a system of pu-
blic subsidies that were directly menaced by a 
debt reduction programme. 
 
The accumulation of public debt by many sub-
Saharan nations in the 1970s and 1980s, and 
the simultaneous collapse in a host of commo-
dity prices in the latter decade and beyond43, 
has thus caused major convulsions in the na-
ture of the state, and its relations with society. 
International lending bodies’ prescriptions for 
streamlined states, liberalized markets and 
greater exports have failed –with notable ex-
ceptions, such as Ghana and Uganda (Tsikata; 
2001)– and in many cases served to undermi-
ne already fragile public institutions, as well as 
forcing people to join en masse the informal, 
subsistence economy (Vergote, 2003; p. 33). 
 
High levels of informality, in both politics and 
the economy, have resulted in the peculiar 
condition of these nations: “Africa was lost 
between state and market” is the conclusion 
reached by one recent study (Harbeson & 
Rothchild, 2000; p. 49). Though most restrict-
tions on free market operations have been lif-
ted, above all those involving foreign invest-
ment, domestic credit markets and business 
regulation remain ill-equipped to generate sta-
ble domestic growth. Poverty rates have in ma-
ny cases worsened - Zambia’s, for instance, 
stood in 2002 at 73 percent44– and entire eco-
nomies have failed to grow or even contracted 
over the course of the 1980s and 1990s45. In 
place of the promised export diversification 
and a thriving private sector, sub-Saharan 
countries have stayed heavily dependent on 
                                                          
43  Cotton prices fell 41.72 percent from 1997 to 2002, sugar by 
39.17 percent and tea by 25.87 percent. See Jubilee 2003; p. 19. 
44  Figures from “Zambia at a Glance,” World Bank. 
 (www.worldbank.org). 
45  This has been the case for Zambia: GDP fell from 3.9 billion 
US dollars in 1982 to 3.7 billion in 2002. GDP per capita, mean-
while, fell by 1.9 percent from 1982 to 1992, and 0.9 percent 
from 1992 to 2002 (Zambia at a Glance, World Bank). 
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their principal export markets, and thus expo-
sed to a constant downward pressure on their 
terms of trade, or at the very least wild fluctua-
tions in price (Jesuit Centre, 2003; p. 6). 
 
This environment of economic malaise and 
instability, however, has not generally led to 
the type of political and social turbulence wit-
nessed under developmental and corporatist 
regimes. In saying this, a contrast must of 
course be drawn between civil unrest and civil 
war: the poorest countries, where GDP per ca-
pita is below $2000 per annum, are much mo-
re prone to internecine warfare. Of the 40 
countries covered by the HIPC programme, 
many, including Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone, Burundi, Angola, Liberia and Somalia 
have restored peace in recent years; a further 
two (Sudan and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo) are still experiencing armed conflict, 
even though the latter is at the penultimate 
stage of reforms required for securing its debt 
relief package (Jubilee, 2003; p. 8).  
 
Regime change generated by civil protest or a 
political transition, on the other hand, are 
much less common than under the other two 
state systems. The rent-seeking clans that ope-
rate states through neo-patrimonial networks 
have in most cases managed to accommodate 
democracy without any significant change in 
political practice: after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall in 1989, some 47 sub-Saharan states un-
dertook reforms aimed at introducing a multi-
party, electoral democracy. Within only a few 
years, however, the political elite had learnt to 
manage these new conditions of competitive 
elections without seeing its hold on power un-
dermined46. Instead of participative democracy, 
many analysts have noted an entrenchment of 
corruption, clan networks and popular disaf-
fection (Anderson (ed), 1999; p. 243); what is 
left of civil organization is to be found outside 
the bounds of political activity. 
 
The neo-patrimonial state, in other words, has 
tended towards the form of despotic autonomy 
discussed above. Unable to achieve any welfa-
re-enhancing modifications to national econo-
mic life, it has perpetuated its rule through 
control of resources and patronage networks, 
often organized to favour one ethnic clan. Its 
claims to genuine legitimacy and autonomy, 
meanwhile, face huge domestic and foreign 
                                                          
46  Zambia was an interesting exception in experiencing a major 
political transition, though as shall be seen, few of the basic con-
ditions of political life in that nation have been altered 
impediments. At home, its public support is 
fragile, and its monopoly on the use of force 
may be exposed to the threat of armed challen-
ge in particular areas of national territory (par-
ticularly where politically underrepresented 
ethnic groups are in a majority). In the in-
ternational community, the states have little 
diplomatic influence, and are subject as a re-
sult of their debt burdens to reform program-
mes that are largely dictated by international 
lending body orthodoxy: in the words of one 
recent report on the HIPC, “creditors (to deb-
tor nations) effectively act as witness, plaintiff, 
policeman, judge and jury in their own court” 
(Jubilee, 2003; p. 25). 
 
Herein lies one of the principal contradictions 
in international debt relations as they affect 
the least developed countries: in order to dic-
tate reforms to these nations, the international 
community identifies the incumbent powers in 
a neo-patrimonial state as the rightful interlo-
cutors in any transactions or negotiations. In 
other words, regimes that count on tenuous 
support at home, and which tend to operate 
outside institutional structures and norms, are 
provided with a major platform for their legi-
timacy – at the cost of conforming to external 
economic demands: according to Jackson 
(1990; p. 25), “never have disparities between 
the outward forms and the inward substance 
of sovereign states been any greater than they 
are today”. This disparity, as we shall observe 
below in greater detail, gives the neo-patri-
monial state a vital space in which to defend 
its hold on power, silence domestic criticism 
of its actions, and gain some traction with the 
exigencies of the IMF or World Bank. In other 
words, a functioning form of autonomy is se-
cured by the ruling powers, yet without any 
real sovereignty being achieved that might sti-
mulate public political participation, or gene-
rate any noticeable progress in economic deve-
lopment. 
 
 
3.2. THREE DEBT CRISES 
 
Recent debt crises in each of the three cases 
under study had momentous effects on the 
economic and political life of the nation. A 
brief account of each one is given below: 
 
Three years of recession in Argentina had led, 
by early 2001, to grave doubts among foreign 
investors and creditors over the country’s ma-
croeconomic stability. High public deficits, 
most notably in the last years of President 
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Carlos Menem’s government (1989-1999), 
when the national overspend (excluding pro-
vincial deficits) reached $4 billion (Rock, 
2002; p. 80), were identified by financial mar-
kets as increasingly unsustainable. In a context 
of decreasing public revenue, the country’s 
ability to honour onerous debt obligations had 
become mired in uncertainty: these doubts 
were translated by the markets into a much 
higher risk premium on Argentine treasury 
bonds. This precautionary measure effectively 
entrenched the breach between the possible 
tax revenues accruing to the state, and the de-
mands simultaneously being made upon it by 
creditors. 
 
Domingo Cavallo’s tenure as economy minis-
ter from April to December 2001, when popu-
lar protests forced his resignation and that of 
President Fernando de la Rúa the next day, 
was marked by a series of ever more desperate 
attempts to seal this gap between public inco-
me and spending. His chief weapon, a “zero 
deficit” law that first cut public sector salaries 
by 13 percent then promised to reduce them in 
line with each month’s deficit requirements, 
only served to deepen recession. By August, 
the government had to turn to emergency fun-
ding of $8 billion from the IMF. Its hopes that 
the funds would restore confidence were da-
shed: capital flight from March to November 
2001 is estimated to have reached $18 billion, 
the spread on US bonds rose relentlessly, the 
monthly public deficit grew larger and the eco-
nomy continued to contract. The creation, in 
this period, of numerous paper currencies u-
sed by provinces and the Buenos Aires city ad-
ministration to pay employees, is perhaps the 
most fitting testimony to the country’s neme-
sis: a monetary drought. 
 
By the second half of the year, it was becoming 
clear to the IMF and foreign investors that the 
monetary policy which had ruled Argentina 
for the past 11 years – convertibility and parity 
between the US dollar and the peso47 – could 
no longer be sustained. The state, deprived of 
monetary autonomy by the tie to the dollar, 
had been obliged to seek a solution to its de-
ficit in fiscal contraction and tightening of the 
money supply (Perry, 2002). So severe was 
this tightening that in late November, cash 
withdrawals from banks were restricted (the 
so-called “corralito”). Application a few days 
later for a fresh injection of dollars from the 
                                                          
47  Meaning that each Argentine peso in circulation had to be 
backed in the central bank’s reserves by a corresponding dollar. 
IMF was refused, forcing Cavallo to file a bud-
get for next year that would have cut public 
spending by $9 billion. It was in this context 
that riots and shop ransacking, in large part 
motivated by local Peronist political bosses, 
occurred across Greater Buenos Aires, promp-
ting President De la Rúa’s declaration of a state 
of siege, and as a result the mass protests 
against his government in the capital on De-
cember 20 and 21. The next two weeks saw 
four different presidents take office amid in-
tense popular turbulence; by the end of that 
period, a default on private debt had been de-
clared, and convertibility had been scrapped. 
 
The crisis in Indonesia was quite different in 
origin to that of Argentina. Unlike the Latin 
American nation, the country was neither in 
recession (growth for early 1996 stood at 8 
percent), nor did it possess a particularly bur-
densome public debt ($65.3 billion in 1995, or 
33 percent of GDP). Indeed Suharto’s Indone-
sia had long been regarded within internatio-
nal financial circles as a reliable debtor, having 
honoured its debts even during a devaluation 
crisis in 1986 (Forrester, 1999; p. 107). But in 
contrast to previous episodes of financial tur-
bulence, the country’s economy and political 
system were profoundly affected by the Asian 
crisis between 1997 to 1998; to explain this, 
attention must be focused on short-term debt 
accumulated in international markets, and 
thus in foreign currencies, by the private sec-
tor. 
 
During the 1990s, Indonesia enjoyed a massive 
boom in foreign capital. The value of the Ja-
karta Stock Exchange, to take one prominent 
example, swelled enormously, with the num-
ber of companies listed rising from 24 to 282. 
But capital-hungry local companies also resor-
ted to other, less transparent means to secure 
investment: many issued 270-day high-interes-
ted credit notes, called Commercial Paper. Se-
veral larger firms created their own banks (the 
number of banks operating in Indonesia rose 
from 124 in 1988 to 240 in 1994 (O’Rourke, 
2002; p. 24)), which in turn could attract de-
positors’ and investors’ money; this could then 
be lent at generous rates to the parent compa-
ny. Through a variety of such mechanisms, 
prominent companies – many of them with in-
timate connections to Suharto’s clan – guaran-
teed a constant supply of liquidity and easy 
rollovers of outstanding debt. 
 
By July 1997, when Thailand devalued, these 
commercial practices has created a private sec-
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tor debt totalling $80 billion; this sum was 
around four times the Indonesian central 
bank’s reserves (O’Rourke, 2002; p. 41), and 
signified a huge increase on the equivalent to-
tal for 1990, which stood at just over $20 bil-
lion48. Clearly the ability to process this debt 
depended crucially on the value of the Indo-
nesia currency, the rupiah, against the dollar 
and the yen. Although there had been little 
pressure to depreciate the rupiah beyond its 
“crawling peg” prior to this date, the exoge-
nous shock of the Thai devaluation – and the 
contagion it generated via panic selling across 
Asia – exposed these structural weakness in 
the Indonesian economy, and thereby haste-
ned the crisis that unfolded over the next year. 
 
Throughout the second half 1997, hunger for 
dollars, particularly from heavily indebted bu-
sinesses, drove the rupiah to well under half 
its mid-year value; just as in Argentina, some 
$8 billion was transferred offshore in the last 
three months of the year. Early IMF interven-
tion, via a structural reform programme that 
included the abrupt closure of 16 banks (an-
nounced on November 1), only aggravated this 
crisis of confidence (as the IMF has itself ad-
mitted49), while government policy towards its 
favoured businesses and banks remained large-
ly unaltered. 
 
By early 1998, the inflation caused by devalua-
tion and abusive lending from the central bank 
to illiquid private banks50 had generated soa-
ring food prices, a sharp contraction in real in-
comes, a series of ethnic riots across the coun-
try and an escalating political crisis. Massive 
rioting across Jakarta’s poorest areas (known 
as the kampung) and in other towns in May 
1998 testified to the level of popular unrest 
and to the complete inability of the security 
forces to cope: three days of violence ended on 
May 16 with a total of 1,217 deaths and wi-
despread destruction of property (including 
122 branches of a bank owned by Suharto’s 
family). On May 21, after 33 years in power, 
Suharto finally tendered his resignation. 
 
The debt crisis faced by Zambia, meanwhile, 
                                                          
48  Figures from the Asian Development Bank. It should be noted 
that public long-term debt from 1990 to 1998 only rose from 
$47.9 billion to $67.3 billion. 
49  “An internal review published in September found the fund’s 
actions contributed to the 13 percent fall in GDP in 1998 that 
made Indonesia the worst-hit of the Asian crisis economies” ac-
cording to the Financial Times, 15/10/2003. 
50  From the end of October 1997 to the end of January 1998, 
cash in circulation increased by 50 percent (O’Rourke, 2002; p. 
60). 
derived almost entirely from excessive lending 
to that country from the IMF and World Bank 
in the 1970s and early 1980s: some 90 percent 
of the debt, which now stand at around $4.5 
billion (or 104 percent of the country’s GDP, 
one of the highest debt ratios for developing 
countries in the world), is owed to bilateral 
and multilateral lenders (IMF Policy Depart-
ment, 1998; p. 129). Economic stagnation, be-
ginning in the 1970s, forced the World Bank 
to recategorize the country from middle inco-
me to low income in 1981 (the same decision 
was taken with respect to Ghana in 1983 and 
Nigeria in 1990), prompting international len-
ding bodies into making a series of demands 
for reform to major parts of the domestic eco-
nomy. 
 
As a result, a fierce decade-long battle ensued 
between international lending bodies and Pre-
sident Kenneth Kaunda’s United National In-
dependent Party government, which resolved 
to resist the prescriptions of lending bodies, 
and in parallel with Alan García in Peru, limit 
debt servicing to 10 percent of export value. 
This decision, taken in 1987, caused multilate-
ral creditors to halt new loans to the country, 
thereby provoking a serious public spending 
crisis and deeper economic turmoil. Just three 
years later, Kaunda returned to the negotiating 
table, and agreed to implement a programme 
of structural adjustment, starting with an end 
to the abovementioned cornmeal subsidies. 
Fresh rioting in Lusaka over these plans, 
which killed 27 people, and widespread ex-
haustion with Kaunda’s 27-year rule, led to his 
party’s defeat at the elections of 1991, and the 
creation of a new government run by President 
Frederick Chiluba’s Movement for Multiparty 
Democracy (MMD). 
 
Chiluba’s administration instantly embarked 
on the long-suspended reform programme: 
cornmeal subsidies were scrapped, many busi-
ness regulations were abolished, strict budget 
limits were devised, and a programme of mass 
privatisation was launched. Even so, it is ge-
nerally acknowledged that by the mid-1990s, 
amid continued economic stagnation, the re-
form plans lost their momentum, and have 
since dissipated into renewed struggles bet-
ween multilateral lenders and the Zambian go-
vernment over budget cuts and privatisation of 
key business concerns, above all the country’s 
copper mines. According to one recent World 
Bank-sponsored study, the prevailing mood 
between the two sides is now one of “mutual 
distrust” (Devarajan et al, 2001; p. 579). 
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3.3. THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF DEBT CRISES 
 
In spite of major differences between these 
countries in the evolution of their crises – 
most notably in the form of debt involved (pri-
vate or public) or in the efforts taken to con-
trol monetary turbulence (“zero deficit” in Ar-
gentina, inflationary financing in Indonesia, 
vacillating reform in Zambia) – the effects on 
society and political authority experienced by 
all three countries reveal a number of signifi-
cant shared features. Examination of these ef-
fects is of course a crucial step towards under-
standing the dynamics that influence the au-
thority and legitimacy of the nation-state, 
which is all three cases is exposed to challen-
ges from below (the aggrieved population) and 
from abroad (creditors, either public or pri-
vate). 
 
Close examination of the crises and their after-
math in the three case studies reveals four 
broad effects on society and political authority: 
 
1. Socio-economic crises and mass impo-
verishment 
 
In all three countries, debt crises, particu-
larly in their “triplicated” version, produce 
a general systemic shock; poverty, as a re-
sult, has invariably risen sharply. Statistics 
from Argentina and Indonesia reveal extra-
ordinary parallels in this respect. In the 
year to October 2002 in Argentina, for ins-
tance, over six million people fell beneath 
the poverty line, and the poverty rate rose 
to 57 percent by 2003 from its previous le-
vels of around 30 percent during the 
1990s. Impoverishment in Indonesia, 
meanwhile, provided the main background 
to the rioting and ethnic tensions of early 
1998: one estimate suggests that 210,000 
Indonesians fell below the poverty line 
every day during that year, generating 
chronic food shortages (so-called nepot 
nasi) in poor areas (Forrester, 1999; p. 
107). Figures from the World Bank indica-
te that the headcount poverty index in In-
donesia rose from 15.7 in 1996 to 27.1 in 
1999 (CGI, 2003; p. 51). 
 
Heavily indebted countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa, for their part, are among the poo-
rest countries in the world: in the words of 
one analyst, the 33 states in the region that 
joined the HIPC initiative upon its crea-
tion in 1996 form “an international under-
class of states on the margins of the globa-
lizing world economy” (Harbeson & Roth-
child, 2000; p. 66). The burden of their 
combined debts at that time, $215 billion 
(or twice their total export earnings for a 
year), can itself be interpreted as a chronic 
source of continued under-development, 
economic vulnerability and investment 
risk: one IMF study found that high debt 
levels tend to crowd out government social 
spending, “in part because governments 
find it politically easier to cut back spen-
ding in such sectors because the poor are 
not usually organized to have a voice in 
such decisions” (Loko et al, 2003; p. 17)51.  
 
Debt crises in these countries, often caused 
by sharp falls in commodity prices, have 
generally served to turn these underlying 
vulnerabilities into unmanageable shocks. 
From 1980 to 1986, for instance, the decli-
ne in copper prices caused Zambia’s debt 
to GDP ratio to rise from 84 percent to 
344.4 percent (Grindle, 1996; p. 25), pro-
viding the pretext to the reform plans, po-
pular protests and political instability of 
the next five years. As in other debt-ridden 
countries in the 1980s, notably Mexico 
and Brazil, the proportion of Zambia’s 
budgets spent on education, health and so-
cial welfare decreased markedly52. Public 
sector salaries in sub-Saharan Africa, re-
presenting one of the few sources of for-
mal employment in these countries, plum-
meted in turn: the head of the Ugandan 
civil service earned in 1988 around three 
percent of the salary earned in 1975 (Ibid; 
p. 41). 
 
2. Democratic pressures 
 
Rapid declines in standards of living, par-
ticularly in a context of limited political 
participation or state legitimacy, tend to 
generate vociferous demands for democra-
cy. One key motivation is the popular de-
sire to punish the previous regime, whose 
ostentatious practices often contrast shar-
ply with the reduced purchasing power of 
the population. Indonesia is perhaps the fi-
nest example of this process: around 70 
                                                          
51  These arguments are contested by Bird & Milne (2003), 
who insist that the absolute level of debt – rather then the 
net debt servicing payments in any given year – is irrele-
vant to a country’s economic performance. 
52  Interest payments on debt accounted for over 50 percent 
of government spending in Brazil, Mexico, Peru and Zam-
bia in 1991 (Grindle, 1996; p. 25). 
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new political parties were created in the af-
termath of Suharto’s resignation (Forres-
ter, 1999; p. xix) and the lifting on the ban 
of parties in June 1998. Parliamentary and 
presidential elections were held the next 
year, representing the definitive end to Su-
harto’s tightly managed institutional arran-
gements, and formal controls over civil so-
ciety organizations and the media have 
been scrapped: the result has been a “new 
level of transparency and competition in 
Indonesian public life” (CGI, 2003; p. 39), 
evident in the wide range of candidates 
standing in the presidential elections of 
2004. 
 
These moves towards democracy, howe-
ver, have been contested by elites connec-
ted with the institutions that dominate Su-
harto’s regime, which have sought with so-
me success to maintain control over the 
judiciary and channels of public finance. 
According to the World Bank, “there are 
increasing signs that old elites and a set of 
new players, especially at the regional le-
vel, are using ‘money politics’ to solidify 
privileged positions in the new political 
system” (CGI, 2003; p. 39). An identical 
dynamic of popular calls for greater demo-
cracy conflicting with entrenched elite in-
terests was evident in the year following 
the Argentine crisis: the public image of all 
state institutions reached unprecedented 
lows, while new civil organizational forms 
(neighbourhood assemblies, savers’ asso-
ciations, piquetero groups) fought to de-
fend their interests. In the case of Zambia, 
the democratic convulsions of the early 
1990s ended with the reestablishment of a 
new political elite; efforts to limit demo-
cratic participation and openness were ini-
tiated in 1996, only to provoke a rapid 
exodus of foreign donors. 
 
3. Relocation of public authority 
 
Intimately connected with this pressure to-
wards democracy is the tendency for civil 
groups, particularly those that suffer most 
acutely from the systemic crisis, to seek 
out new authority structures; in extreme 
cases in sub-Saharan Africa, this has invol-
ved bypassing conventional state structu-
res, and replacing patronage-based politi-
cal networks that are no longer able to 
provide vital resources with a series of in-
formal community structures. Within Ar-
gentina, the trend towards barter clubs 
(trueque), piquetero groups and neigh-
bourhood assemblies also manifested a ge-
neral public need to find a means of survi-
val outside the normal institutions of the 
state and market. 
 
Meanwhile, the political turbulence caused 
by debt crises will often entail a vacuum in 
power that can entail internecine institu-
tional warfare, or the entrenchment of a 
new system of authority. Indonesia clearly 
experienced the former in the period 
1998-1999, during which time various 
outbreaks of civil unrest were heavily in-
fluenced by different political factions. The 
military repression in East Timor, for its 
part, seems to have been heavily influen-
ced by the political ambitions of General 
Wiranto, the armed forces commanders 
under Suharto from 1994 to 1998, who 
has been identified by UN prosecutors as a 
chief culprit for the killing of 1,400 people 
in East Timor in 199953. In Argentina, on 
other hand, the crucial power-brokers 
throughout the crisis period were provin-
cial political leaders, most of them from 
the Peronist party. 
 
4. Intervention from abroad 
 
Pressure from abroad on a country to ho-
nour its debt repayments, or at least at-
tempt to carry out reforms so that debt ser-
vicing can be restored to normality, is an 
intrinsic part of all these crises. As discus-
sed earlier, there is no direct means to en-
force these demands, but the costs for a 
state of failing to comply in any way with 
creditors’ wishes are high: in the case of 
Zambia, the freeze on credit caused by the 
halt to the reform programme in 1987 was 
particularly disastrous. 
 
Making the provision of future credit de-
pendent on domestic structural reform is 
the principal means by which international 
lending bodies and foreign investors seek 
to influence any given nation; indeed ma-
ny financiers regard such crises as the ideal 
opportunity to bring about the changes (or 
“convergence”) they long for. In a study of 
the Asian crisis, Feldstein (2002; p. 28) ar-
gues that “‘mandatory’ changes went far 
beyond what was necessary to stabilize the 
individual economies or to allow them to 
                                                          
53  Wiranto was also a candidate in the 2004 presidential 
elections, but lost out in the first round in July. 
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regain voluntary access to the global capi-
tal markets…. The Fund’s managing direc-
tor, Michel Camdessus, once commented 
that the crises were a blessing in disguise 
because they provided the Fund with the 
opportunity to improve the economic 
structure and governance of these coun-
tries”. Yet as we shall see more clearly in 
the next chapter, these structural demands 
are not always successful: Malaysia flouted 
IMF advice by adopting capital controls; 
Argentina has watered down or ignored 
structural prescriptions from Washington; 
and Zambia regularly violates its own pro-
mises. 
 
 
 
4. Debt and sovereignty 
 
The socio-political effects of debt crises, which 
were discussed in the previous chapter, point 
to a general weakening of the state and tradi-
tional authority. Taken in combination, popu-
lar impoverishment, demands for greater parti-
cipation by recently mobilized social groups, a 
shift in allegiance to new sources of authority 
and increased intervention from foreign po-
wers would appear to sap the state of its legi-
timacy and autonomy. Similar processes of po-
litical degeneration – involving an expansion 
of competing social claims combined with a 
weakening of the state’s capacity to resolve or 
reconcile them – are of course to be found in 
many instances across the developing world, 
with or without a debt crisis to provoke them. 
This combination, for example, lies at the root 
of Huntington’s study of political instability in 
developing countries (Huntington, 1967), whi-
le Kohli’s account of governability within India 
points to the contradiction between a highly 
politicised society of multiple competing fac-
tions and an excessively over-personalized sta-
te as the key to that country’s rising violence 
and public disorder in the late 1980s: “the sta-
te is omnipresent, but feeble; it is highly cen-
tralized and interventionist, but seems power-
less” (Kohli, 1990; p. 8). 
 
Debt crises, however, are markedly distinct in 
one particular way: whereas the political evo-
lution discussed by Huntington and Kohli re-
lies upon a domestic momentum, driven large-
ly by economic and social modernization, fo-
reign debt crises are the result of a mismatch 
between domestic financial resources and in-
ternational demands. Throughout such pe-
riods, as seen in the previous chapter, foreign 
creditors and international financial institu-
tions seek to exert their influence, and will ta-
ke every opportunity to bring about lasting 
change in the indebted countries’ economic 
structures so as to ensure reliable debt servi-
cing in the future. In terms of the concepts of 
legitimacy and autonomy, the state appears to 
be threatened both from within and from out-
side: foreign creditors and lending bodies do 
not necessarily recognize the importance for 
the state of satisfying domestic interests or 
maintaining basic welfare levels (thereby 
threatening state legitimacy)54, nor do they lea-
ve the state to devise its own policies and de-
velopment initiatives (a threat to autonomy). 
 
Analysing the state in a developing country so-
lely through the conceptual tools of legitimacy 
and autonomy, however, has a limited scope. 
Both are of greater value when applied exclu-
sively to the domestic arena; indeed, they refer 
almost entirely to the relations between a state 
and the society that it governs, whereas foreign 
interference only exerts any direct influence 
on the autonomy of the state – and even then 
within the limits postulated in chapter 2. A 
more valuable concept to deal with the com-
plexity of this three-way interchange between 
society, state and foreign powers is sovereign-
ty, which can broadly speaking be defined as 
the freedom of action of a nation-state, and the 
capacity to implement the policies that it has 
freely chosen 
 
 
 
4.1. THE NATURE OF SOVEREIGNTY 
 
Sovereignty, though used with great frequency 
to describe the rights and entitlements of a na-
tion-state, is far from being a clear concept, or 
even one that is normatively desirable in all ca-
ses. European Union countries, for instance, 
are said to have “bargained away” sovereignty 
in an effort to gain greater traction over shared 
concerns, such as integration with the global 
economy, crime or the environment (Keohane, 
1995; p.177). Sovereignty is also regarded as a 
lesser concern in cases where violations are 
human rights have been perpetrated on a mass 
scale by any given state, or when that state has 
                                                          
54  The recognition of the domestic balance of forces is of course 
a delicate matter. In the case of Zambia, the IMF and World 
Bank pushed for reform (above all the end to maize subsidies) in 
the face of popular resistance, as manifested by the riots in Lusa-
ka and Kitwe of June 1990. The institutions were nevertheless 
much more content to implement the reforms via a supportive 
government after October 1991. 
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infringed on the sovereignty of others. 
 
Sovereignty, therefore, can be lost, exchanged 
or overruled. Its precise dimensions – as com-
pared to the remit of international law, for ins-
tance – fluctuate according to changes in the 
international diplomatic environment, leading 
some experts to label sovereignty as an “ever-
changing description of the essential authori-
ties of the state” (Heller & Sofaer, in Krassner 
(ed.), 2001. p. 45), and therefore as little more 
than a working tool by which state leaders and 
diplomats agree to operate. Yet even if this 
pragmatic interpretation is accepted, it re-
mains clear that the concept itself contains se-
veral dimensions which are important to dis-
sect. 
 
According to Krassner ((ed.) 2001; chapter in 
Smith et al (eds), 1999), the concept of sove-
reignty should be unbundled into four separa-
te elements so as best to encapsulate its do-
mestic and international significance. These 
are: 
 
1. Interdependence sovereignty: the ability 
of a government to control activities that 
are transnational in origin, but reach wit-
hin a nation-state’s border (e.g. crime, 
environmental damage, terrorism). 
 
2. Domestic sovereignty: the capacity of sta-
te in any given polity to exert authority 
and ensure that its policies are imple-
mented. 
 
3. Westphalian sovereignty: the exclusion 
of influence over a country’s domestic af-
fairs by an external authority. 
 
4. International legal sovereignty: the inter-
national recognition of a state. 
 
Clearly, as Krassner himself explains, it is un-
common for all four branches of sovereignty to 
be respected to precisely the same degree, or 
for them to respond identically to political or 
diplomatic changes: in the case of European 
Union legislation, for instance, Westphalian 
sovereignty may be said to have reduced in 
member-states in return for greater interde-
pendence sovereignty. Likewise, Krassner ob-
serves that “in a situation in which domestic 
sovereignty is problematic, international re-
cognition can enhance the position of rulers by 
signalling to constituents that a ruler may have 
access to international resources such as al-
liances and sovereign lending” (Krassner (ed.), 
2001; p. 10). As we shall see below, this sort of 
sovereignty exchange is crucial to understan-
ding the state during and after debt crises. 
 
For the moment, we should recognize that the 
two-way process of sovereignty – understood 
as the state’s capacity to exert authority at ho-
me and secure its status abroad – enhances the 
largely domestic concepts of legitimacy and 
autonomy, though at the cost of greater com-
plexity. Furthermore, we must acknowledge 
the dominant view of sovereignty and debt in 
development literature: namely, that the inten-
sity and significance of global financial flows 
are emblematic of globalization, and that they 
intrinsically undermine the sovereignty of the 
nation-state by transferring power to markets, 
or to states or blocs with global economic in-
fluence (largely via the powers invested in in-
ternational lending bodies). This perspective is 
embraced by Strange (1996), and is reflected 
in many studies of individual countries: “cu-
rrent approaches to resolving the debt crisis of 
developing countries, especially Zambia, allow 
creditors including the IMF and World Bank 
to contravene national sovereignty of indepen-
dent states” (Jones Zulu, 2003; p. 11). 
 
 
 
4.2. SOVEREIGNTY IN THE LEAST 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
 
It is undeniable that an extremely large num-
ber of states in the developing world – and 
above all the 38 countries currently included 
in the HIPC initiative – have been systemati-
cally weakened by the effort to meet the de-
mands of both foreign and domestic interests 
in a context of scarce resources. In many such 
places, policy initiatives and choices are deci-
ded almost entirely by the main donors (Deva-
rajan et al, 2001; p. 21), while a largely passive 
political management within the country seeks 
to maintain its bases of power. Recurring con-
flict between these two main claimants on the 
state is now often shaped by threats to with-
draw aid or debt relief if major reforms are not 
introduced: in 2003, for instance, nine coun-
tries in the crucial interim period of the HPIC 
initiative were considered by the IMF to be 
“off track”55, while Zambia was itself menaced 
                                                          
55  The period in question is that between Decision Point and 
Completion Point, where the most significant amount of debt 
relief is provided. The latest information (March 2006) from the 
World Bank indicated that 18 countries have reached Comple-
tion Point (qualifying for $37 billion in debt relief), 10 Decision 
Point, and 10 Pre-Decision Point (see www.worldbank.org/hipc) 
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with a cut of $1 billion in debt relief if it did 
not privatise its national bank, ZNCB (Jubilee, 
2003; pp 17-18)56.  
 
Domestic political elites in these countries, 
meanwhile, seek ways in which to placate or 
confront donors’ demands, knowing all the 
while that they may themselves by thrown out 
of power if they are unable to satisfy domestic 
constituencies in the process. But even in the 
event of intense political competition at home, 
foreign donors’ criteria still tend to prevail in 
decisions over which reforms should be ap-
plied to the economy and major institutions. 
This, and the continuous friction between 
domestic elites, donors and domestic social 
groups, helps generate what has become the 
key characteristic of many sub-Saharan and 
Andean states: inaction and passivity in the fa-
ce of demands made either abroad or at home.  
 
Development initiatives in heavily indebted 
countries are almost entirely the work of do-
nor-imposed policy and expertise, on whose 
funds the initiatives entirely depend, while the 
state is restricted to an incomplete presence in 
the national territory. In Latin America, this 
translates into the absence of social rights (ba-
sic welfare and steady employment) for all but 
a minority57, and in Africa by a similar minimal 
provision of basic services, aggravated by an 
outright lack of state authority in certain areas. 
In essence, we may talk here of what Robert 
Jackson calls “negative sovereignty”: the states 
in question may be legitimated by their pre-
sence in the United Nations and their relations 
with international financial institutions, and 
thus have “international legal sovereignty” as 
defined above, but within their territories they 
are weak, dependent on foreign development 
aid, powerless to improve public welfare, and 
often representative of one minority part of so-
ciety. 
 
 
 
4.3. SOVEREIGNTY IN THE LOWER TO 
MIDDLE INCOME STATES 
 
At the same time, there is growing evidence 
that in other indebted countries – principally 
those in the lower to middle income bracket, 
                                                          
56 The government finally invited bids for 49 percent of the bank 
in 2005. 
57  According to a major UNPD report (2004; p. 26), “the ten-
dencies found in relation to social citizenship are very distur-
bing, and constitute the main challenges facing Latin American 
democracies”. 
with significant populations and in certain ca-
ses geo-strategic importance – the account gi-
ven above of states weakened by their depen-
dence on donor approval and a growing lack 
of domestic authority does not entirely hold. 
In countries such as Brazil, Turkey, Argentina, 
Indonesia and Mexico, debt crises have had 
profound effects on the shape of political po-
wer. They have been instrumental in redefi-
ning the basic structure of relations between 
state, society and the private sector, in the pro-
cess creating new approaches toward foreign 
lenders and business.  
 
This is not to say, however, that the resulting 
transformations have been uniform in charac-
ter. The moderate Islamic government of Re-
cep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development 
party (AKP), for example, has achieved a high 
level of macroeconomic stability, stayed “on 
track” with IMF prescriptions, and established 
near total control over the state since coming 
to power in November 2002: the AKP “com-
pletely dominates the political landscape, both 
locally and nationally” asserted one recent re-
port on the country58. Brazil, Indonesia and 
Mexico, meanwhile, have all witnessed impor-
tant shifts in the composition and outlook of 
the state in the wake of major debt crises, no-
tably the election of the Luiz Inácio da Silva’s 
Workers’ Party in Brazil (October 2002), the 
government of Megawati Sukarnoputri in In-
donesia (from 2001 to 2004) and both the 
shift of the Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(PRI) toward free-market orthodoxy under 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) and the 
end to the PRI’s hegemony in 2000 in Mexico.  
 
In contrast to the current Turkish state, howe-
ver, these new-style states have been frequent-
ly under threat, or menaced by their evident 
weakness – most notably in Indonesia, where 
according to a donors’ report, “the high hopes 
that the Reformasi movement would break the 
hold of the vested interests behind the corrup-
tions, cronyism and nepotism of the Suharto 
era have not been realized” (CGI, 2003; p. 39). 
All these countries have nevertheless sought to 
follow IMF policy, albeit with reluctance and 
the need to placate significant domestic oppo-
sition in the process. Their economic policies 
have endeavoured above all to be prudent, ai-
ming to avert possible crises by taming infla-
tion, reining in government spending, and 
avoiding  unnecessary debt. 
 
                                                          
58  Special Report on Turkey, Financial Times, 27/4/2004. 
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Argentina is at present the exception, in see-
king to combine a confrontational policy with 
international lenders and an effort to reform 
and relegitimate the state. As in Turkey, the 
post-crisis governments of Eduardo Duhalde 
and Néstor Kirchner have managed to restore 
a single-party hegemony (that of the Pero-
nists), and to secure high levels of public ap-
proval following their efforts at institutional 
reconstruction and a return to economic 
growth (at annual rates of between 8 and 9 
percent from 2003 to 2005). The sustainability 
or flexibility of this political strategy – parti-
cularly once the country’s economy reaches its 
full capacity and renewed foreign credit is re-
quired – has yet to be established. 
 
 
 
4.4. BUILDING STATE CAPACITY IN POST-
CRISIS ENVIRONMENTS 
 
There is no doubt, then, that the five countries 
listed above have experienced one form or 
other of systemic shock resulting from debt 
crises, and have soon after embarked on a ma-
jor political reconfiguration. In contrast to the 
HIPC nations, all five can be considered deve-
lopmental or corporatist states – in other 
words, states that have traditionally espoused 
policies based on public intervention and eco-
nomic progress, and which have had at one 
stage the means to implement them. Instead of 
the passivity and opportunism that characteri-
se the indebted neo-patrimonial state, which 
tends to view reforms imposed by donors as a 
strategic ploy to lever more financial aid (De-
verajan et al., 2001; p. 586), debt crises in the-
se countries have tended to foster a new eco-
nomic equilibrium and domestic political set-
tlement, in which efforts to transform the role 
and efficacy of the state are fundamental. 
 
Achieving this, however, is far from easy. As 
we saw in the previous chapter, debt crises 
produce major social and economic convul-
sions, undermine traditional channels of poli-
tical authority, and expose the state to intense 
pressure from abroad. To assure economic sta-
bility and the creation of new institutional 
arrangements, the state – while under clear 
threat – must make full use of the legitimacy 
and autonomy it has at its disposal.  
 
In other words, the attempted regenerative 
processes described above depend crucially on 
securing public approval (legitimacy), and fin-
ding spheres of political influence in which the 
role of the state in decision-making and coor-
dination is vital, and where it preferably faces 
few or no challenges from home or abroad to 
its own initiatives (autonomy). If the state is 
thus able to enhance its independent capacity, 
the key question then arises of how its sove-
reignty – defined in both domestic and inter-
national terms – has been affected. 
 
There are five principal forms in which the sta-
te can acquire greater margin for manoeuvre 
through its claims to autonomy and legitimacy 
in the aftermath of debt crises: 
 
1. The state as a go-between 
 
Perhaps most importantly, the state 
throughout a debt crisis remains the sole 
interlocutor between the country and in-
ternational lending bodies, and is thus in a 
privileged position to determine the natio-
nal response to foreign creditors’ demands. 
Where the state is neo-patrimonial, this 
status is largely exploited through leaders’ 
effort to “play the game” of conditionality, 
and thereby secure funds while not depri-
ving themselves of power or resources; in 
many cases, the state’s main bargaining 
tool is in fact its own internal disorder, 
and the danger of violence or civil war 
should aid not be forthcoming (Chabal & 
Daloz, 2000; p. 167; Jackson, 1990; p. 
34)59. Similarly, in Indonesia from 1998 to 
1999, many outbreaks of ethnic violence 
appeared to have been sponsored by fac-
tions of the state or political forces (most 
notably the repression East Timor, the an-
ti-Chinese and Christian riots in North Ja-
karta, and the killing of dozens of Muslims 
in East Java60), with the aim both of justi-
fying limits on democracy and attracting 
additional international aid 
 
Rather than resort to such tactics, howe-
ver, corporatist and developmental states 
generally seek to consolidate their status as 
the key conduit for communication bet-
ween numerous domestic constituencies 
and foreign creditors; as such, they can de-
fine the nation’s post-crisis strategy on be-
half of multiple affected groups, and claim 
                                                          
59  In this respect it is interesting to note that donor aid to 
Zambia began to increase in the late 1990s due to fears of 
regional instability and war (Devarajan et al (eds), 2001; p. 
578). 
60  See O’Rourke (2002), pp 170-171; 186-187; 274-280. 
According to the author, the UN Security Council envoys 
to East Timor in September 1999 “reported [….] that the 
military was able to ‘switch the violence on and of’ at will.” 
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unrivalled authority. The resulting strategy 
of the government is essential to its own 
identity, and can even anchor its entire so-
cial and economic ideology. In Argentina, 
President Kirchner and former Economy 
Minister Roberto Lavagna regularly portra-
yed their stance in negotiations with the 
IMF in terms of support for the poor, de-
fence of the nation-state, and the exercise 
of legitimate authority: “[The debt] is the 
responsibility of bad Argentine govern-
ments, but also those who backed them”, 
Kirchner declared before Congress in 
March 2003. “[It will not be paid] at the 
cost of the hunger and poverty of thou-
sands of Argentines, generating more po-
verty and conflict”.  
 
Leaders of Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico and 
Turkey, on the other hand, have tended to 
stress their fiscal responsibility, and ability 
to maintain social order and economic 
growth by adhering strictly to the terms of 
IMF programmes61. Even so, all these latter 
states have managed to gain a certain auto-
nomy in debt talks in accordance with the 
so-called “Schelling Conjecture,” which 
stipulates that one side in a negotiation 
(namely, the state) can “often benefit from 
having [its] hands tied” by domestic cons-
tituencies or a legislature (Frieden & Mar-
tin, 2003; p. 124); as a result, the state can 
extract more generous debt conditions 
through the strategic use of its own do-
mestic opposition or the prospect of wi-
despread social unrest. 
 
2. Economic independence 
 
A degree of independence in economic po-
licy after the crisis is crucial to re-esta-
blishing a modicum of state autonomy and 
legitimacy; if none can be established, i.e if 
the state is entirely dependent on donor 
funds for its budget needs and thus lender-
imposed economic orthodoxy, then its au-
thority and capacity to meet domestic de-
mands is gravely affected.  
 
One key source for this economic indepen-
dence lies in the balance of trade: both 
South Korea after the 1997-8 crisis and Ar-
gentina post-2001 began their economic 
recoveries by posting huge trade surpluses. 
                                                          
61  “We have to think of what Brazil will be like in 15 or 20 
years, and create a solid base for the governments that co-
me in the future.” President Luiz Inácio da Silva, quoted in 
El País, 20/06/2004. 
Aside from stabilising the currency and re-
plenishing spent central bank reserves, the 
imposition of taxes on Argentine exports – 
over 50 percent of which in 2003 were 
agricultural goods62 – boosted public reve-
nues at a critical time. In Korea, a collapse 
in imports and increase in exports enabled 
the country to acquire $50 billion in reser-
ves by late 2000, and shortly after graduate 
from its much-despised IMF programme 
(Feldstein, 2002; p. 20 & 30). Likewise, 
Brazil’s economic recovery, which appears 
destined to entrench the reforming Wor-
kers’ Party government, has been anchored 
in a massive increase in exports: foreign 
sales have risen 63 percent from 2002 to 
2004, and the trade surplus in the year to 
August 2004 amounted to $31.6 billion, 
“the largest for any emerging market ex-
cept for oil-exporting Russia”63. 
 
As discussed above, a key feature of the 
search for economic dependence has been 
prudence: in all the countries mentioned 
above, national authorities have been in-
tent on controlling inflation and govern-
ment spending, with the clear aim of ensu-
ring macroeconomic stability and averting 
future appeals to international lenders. 
 
Such prudent, export-driven recoveries ha-
ve enabled these countries to alter the ba-
sic terms of their relations with the world 
of international finance. This process, 
which is still in its infancy, could prove 
crucial for the evolution of a new structure 
of power between the developed and deve-
loping worlds; for the moment, however, it 
can be interpreted as a reassertion of natio-
nal economic policy over the Washington-
led demands for global “convergence”. Ar-
gentina and Brazil both announced that 
they would pay off their entire IMF debts 
at the end of 2005, a declaration that Pre-
sident Kirchner honoured within weeks64. 
Turkey’s government for its part has sug-
gested it will not need the IMF beyond 
200865, and Indonesia is considering a si-
                                                          
62  Argentine exports in 2003 totalled $15.6 billion, 54 per-
cent of which were farm products; $2.37 billion came from 
exports of soya, largely to China. 
63  “Selling Brazil,” Financial Times, 15/9/2004. 
64 Kirchner’s formal announcement of the intention of pa-
ying bank $9.8 billion in debt in December 2005 stressed 
that “this debt has constantly been the vehicle for interven-
tions because it is subject to periodic reviews, and has been 
the source and more and more demands that contradict 
themselves and get in the way of sustainable growth.” 
Clarín 16/12/2005. 
65 “Seeing it through,” Financial Times 22/02/2006. 
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milar strategy. Meanwhile, support in aca-
demic circles and in developing countries 
for limited capital controls appears to be 
on the rise, boosted by the evident econo-
mic successes in countries such as India, 
China and Vietnam that have enjoyed long 
periods of protection for their industries 
(Williamson, 2004; p. 15). 
 
Obviously, in countries such as Zambia, 
whose major debt crisis coincided with fal-
ling commodity values, there is virtually 
no way to export out of a crisis, nor to es-
tablish any sort of buffer around national 
economic policy66. 
 
3. Geopolitical considerations 
 
The geopolitical importance of certain na-
tions also provides a vital resource for 
weakened states to salvage their authority 
and restore their finances without exces-
sive interference from abroad. Perhaps the 
most salient recent example has been the 
$19 billion rescue package for Turkey in 
2001; similarly, the bailout of Mexico in 
1994-5 was intimately connected with that 
country’s new status as part of the North 
American Free Trade Association, while 
the $30 billion funding package for Brazil 
in the summer of 2002 can in part be in-
terpreted as a signal of support for a bas-
tion of fiscal prudence and economic or-
thodoxy in a region suffering the after-ef-
fects of the Argentine crisis and a rise in 
left-wing political forces67. Throughout the 
1990s, Russia’s ability to attract IMF loans 
was similarly derived from the sheer politi-
cal and strategic weight of the country, 
and the global significance of its post-So-
viet transformation. In the absence of di-
plomatic or strategic significance, a coun-
try may seek to reinforce its geopolitical 
weight and position in debt negotiations 
through close association with regional al-
lies: Argentina under President Kirchner 
has been noticeably active in this respect, 
and has repeatedly sought to win Brazilian 
backing in its dealings with the IMF68. Li-
                                                          
66  According to Tsikata (2001; p. 23), the first five years of 
donor-backed reform in Zambia after 1991 brought a stag-
nant GDP, no major progress in diversifying exports, and a 
steady fall in per capita income and employment. 
67  Of course another objective was to tie the Workers’ Par-
ty to certain tight fiscal targets before the election. 
68  Not entirely successfully, however: Brazil failed to sup-
port the deal reached between Argentina and the IMF in 
September 2003, while Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso 
Amorim has stressed the difference between the two coun-
tries’ approaches to the Fund (“El canciller Amorim reiteró 
kewise, the 1997-8 crisis has prompted 
greater moves toward regional integration 
in South-East Asia, above all via regional 
trade blocs and accords. 
 
4. Exploiting divisions between creditors 
 
Many states have also managed to gain a 
degree of independence from the demands 
of foreign creditors and donors by exploi-
ting the divisions between them. The Zam-
bian state, for instance, has managed to 
maintain a limited freedom of action by 
adeptly drawing funds from different sets 
of donors according to its political lea-
nings of the time. This intriguing strategy 
began in the 1980s, when the government 
of President Kenneth Kaunda twice cancel-
led structural adjustment programmes a-
greed with international lending bodies (in 
1983 and 1987). On the latter occasion, 
Norway, Japan and the UNDP reacted by 
increasing their financial contributions 
(Devarajan et al, 2001; p. 570). In stark 
contrast, the decision by many bilateral 
donors (including the United States, Nor-
way, Sweden, Holland, Germany and Ja-
pan) to cut off aid in 1996 was motivated 
by signs that President Chiluba’s govern-
ment was veering towards repressive au-
thoritarianism and one-party rule ahead of 
elections that year. The World Bank and 
IMF, however, did not alter their funding 
during this bilateral hiatus, arguing that 
the economic reform programme required 
support. On both occasions, the Zambian 
state found means to gain aid by effectively 
picking the donors it wished to receive 
money from. 
 
A similar approach – namely differential 
treatment of donors/creditors so as to ma-
ximise the state’s freedom of action – was 
adopted by Argentina in the midst of its re-
cent crisis. The decision to default on pay-
ment of its privately held debt (i.e. servi-
cing of 160 different issues of bonds and 
other financial mechanisms69) was taken 
days after the fall of President De La Rúa’s 
government. In March 2005, the Argentine 
government announced that its offer to 
pay back a quarter of the value of these 
bonds had been accepted by over 75 per-
cent of private investors. Argentina’s clear 
                                                                                       
que Brasil apoya pero no imita,” Clarín 9/4/2004). 
69  “Argentina logra carta blanca del FMI,” El País 
21/9/2004. 
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reluctance to pay was made possible by the 
sheer difficulties in coordinating a respon-
se amongst so many creditors, and by the 
absence of any mechanisms in financial 
markets to exert direct power so as to ex-
tract the funds (as discussed in Chapter 2). 
Meanwhile, the post-crisis government in 
Buenos Aires initially kept up payments to 
the IMF, World Bank and Inter-American 
Development Bank in the hope of recei-
ving an emergency funding package, befo-
re changing tack and threatening to with-
hold funds until a deal to roll over future 
repayments was made. This tactic, first 
embraced in October 2002, and used again 
in September 2003 and March 2004, was 
based on the possible harmful effects of 
any Argentine default on the IMF, 16 per-
cent of whose outstanding credit was held 
by that country in 200470. 
 
5. Democratic legitimation 
 
Lastly, and perhaps most obviously, the 
state in a developing country can gain 
enormous impetus and popular legitimacy 
by replacing a disgraced regime, restoring 
democracy and/or taking power following 
a general election. As Diamond has obser-
ved (1998; p. 51), many governments in 
Latin America have enjoyed “legitimacy by 
default” – in other words, they receive 
support by dint of not being the previous 
administration. When this previous admi-
nistration is synonymous with the creation 
of vast foreign debt – as is the case for Pre-
sident Carlos Menem in Argentine and Su-
harto in Indonesia – then the new govern-
ment is often able to blame its predecessor 
for social and economic problems, justify 
any failure to make rapid progress, and de-
fine its ideology by contrasting it with a fi-
gure of general public contempt71. As 
Kirchner observed in a recent interview: 
“Governing Argentina is an extremely hard 
task. That’s why I always say we are still in 
hell. But we have managed to rise up two 
steps”72. This approach has been further 
fortified by a global loss of legitimacy by 
the IMF, which has admitted to grave po-
                                                          
70  “Which is the victim,” The Economist 4/3/2004. 
71  “Odious debt” for its part describes an excessive debt 
burden accumulated by extremely corrupt regimes for pa-
trimonial use (notably the case in the Central African Re-
public and the Democratic Republic of Congo), and has 
proved an effective weapon for least developed countries in 
seeking to gain generous debt relief from international len-
ders.  
72  Interview with Néstor Kirchner, Clarín 23/5/2004. 
licy errors in its treatment of Argentina73, 
Indonesia and other countries affected by 
the Asian crisis. 
 
The shortcomings of this approach, howe-
ver, lie in the limited duration of intense 
public dislike for the previous regime; this 
is perhaps best been revealed by the down-
fall of Megawati’s government in Indonesia 
in 2004, only five years after she and Isla-
mic moderate Abdurrahman Wahid troun-
ced the ruling party (Golkar) in election in 
July 1999. 
 
In the case of Turkey and Brazil, new go-
vernments elected by large majorities in 
2002 have also striven to distance them-
selves from the failures of previous admi-
nistrations, yet without seeking to enact 
major changes in economic and fiscal poli-
cy; indeed, despite their progressive or po-
pulist credentials, both governments have 
emphasised fiscal austerity and low infla-
tion as priorities. Yet at the same time, the 
two administrations have used their electo-
ral momentum to bring about important 
and long-awaited policy initiatives – re-
forms aimed at gaining entry to the EU in 
Turkey, an overhaul of the social security 
scheme in Brazil – and appear on course to 
establishing new political hegemonies wit-
hin their countries. As mentioned above, 
both are also currently seeking to change 
the terms of their relations with internatio-
nal debt servicing programmes, in the ho-
pe of securing greater national freedom in 
economic policy74. 
 
 
 
5. The state in the nexus of 
global power 
 
The two preceding chapters have sought to ex-
plain the conflicting influences on the capacity 
of the state in the aftermath of major debt cri-
ses. A particular focus has been laid on those 
factors which affect the autonomy and legiti-
macy of the state, on the assumption that these 
two characteristics are essential to any assess-
ment of how free the state is to act, and how 
effective its policies may prove. Should the sta-
te prove unable to retain any freedom or effec-
                                                          
73  “IMF urged to tighten oversight of crisis policies,” Fi-
nancial Times 30/6/2004. 
74  Turkey has already raised the minimum wage in spite of 
IMF pressure not to do so (Financial Times, 25/6/2004). 
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tiveness, then it is destined to face a crisis in 
its authority over a nation – and thus become a 
“negative sovereign.” If a state can avoid this 
fate, then it might once again be able to lead a 
concerted development policy in its country 
and enjoy a high degree of political support. 
The contrast between these two outcomes 
illustrates just how high the stakes are in each 
case. 
 
 
 
5.1. POST-CRISIS LEGITIMACY AND 
AUTONOMY 
 
In terms of state legitimacy, both centrifugal 
and centripetal influences are evident in the 
wake of debt crises. Rising poverty and unem-
ployment, political instability and scepticism 
over the state’s ability to make any difference 
to economic conditions generate a shift to-
wards alternative sources of authority – which 
may at extremes lead to outright distrust of the 
state, manifested in moves toward community-
based rule and private measures of self-pro-
tection (Wallerstein in Smith et al (eds), 1999; 
p. 31). On the other hand, the electoral com-
petition that often follows debt crises, in com-
bination with its new status as the nation’s 
chief economic and financial coordinator, can 
greatly enhance public support for the state, 
particularly when the debt burden and econo-
mic chaos is ascribed to the sins of a previous 
regime. 
 
This tension between these contrasting in-
fluences on state legitimacy is reflected most 
clearly in divergent public attitudes towards 
democracy – the system governing all the 
countries in this study. Whereas satisfaction in 
the democratic system often falls sharply in ti-
mes of economic distress, support for demo-
cracy as the rightful or most effective system of 
rule can remain very much higher: this appa-
rent contradiction is regarded by Diamond 
(1998; p. 33) as the result of the differential 
weighting given to the political performance 
(guarantee of freedoms, basic rights, institutio-
nal stability, expression of national identity) 
and the economic record of a regime. Argen-
tina, in particular, registered marked increases 
in support for the democratic system in 2000 
(reaching 70 percent) even as satisfaction with 
the system’s results fell to close to 50 percent75; 
these contrasting trends have continued in re-
cent years. 
                                                          
75  Results of 2000 Latinobarómetro survey. 
A similarly nuanced account can be given of a 
state’s autonomy after a crisis. Though they are 
placed under intense pressure from competing 
social demands and from the requirements of 
foreign creditors and donors, the largely infor-
mal and hybrid nature of the international 
debt regime, along with the supportive contri-
bution of economic, geopolitical and democra-
tic dynamics, mean that a state can secure for 
itself a margin of freedom in which to act.  Yet 
the question remains: is this autonomy effecti-
ve, meaning the state can direct and coordina-
te the nation’s economic and social recovery? 
Or is this a version of “coercive” or “despotic” 
autonomy (Weiss & Hobson, 1995; p. 240), 
which has little power to extract resources 
from the nation or mobilize any sort of econo-
mic activity? 
 
Historically, high levels of state autonomy ha-
ve been underwritten by limits to democracy: 
these constraints enabled authorities to pursue 
fixed and highly orthodox economic policies, 
providing for deeper integration into the glo-
bal economy without succumbing to the pres-
sures of domestic discontent. Perhaps the best 
example of this is the monetary discipline of 
the “gold standard,” established by Britain in 
the 19th century: “until World War I, virtually 
no country put into question the priority given 
to the fixed parities of the gold standards. The-
re was scarcely any awareness that central 
bank policies could be directed to goals such 
as employment” (Eichengreen, 1996; p. 277).  
 
But as Eichengreen and others have argued, 
the rise of democratic systems across the world 
has stripped the historic “insulation” around 
economic and fiscal policy, and subjected 
them to the test of electoral popularity. No 
longer is it as easy for the state to abstain from 
use of its own domestic economic levers in 
response to problems such as high unemploy-
ment; if they do, political elites risk the wrath 
of the electorate. 
 
Meanwhile, and in accordance with the policy 
“trilemma” discussed in chapter two, states in 
the developed world resorted in the decades 
following World War II to capital controls as a 
means to safeguard national economic policy 
initiatives, particularly where these policies re-
volved around import substitution. By the 
1970s, in the midst of intensifying internatio-
nal economic relations and the decline of the 
Bretton-Woods system, both the developing 
and developed world moved progressively to-
ward floating exchange rates - present in 50 
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percent of IMF members in 1994 in place of 25 
percent in 1984 (Ibid; p. 273)76.  
 
Yet as we have already seen, this trend did not 
last long. Global economic ties, the threat of 
sudden market-driven devaluation and the in-
creased role of the IMF and World Bank in 
sponsoring adjustment programmes, served in 
many cases – notably in South-East Asia and 
Latin America- to discredit the floating ex-
change rate as a means to protect a nation’s 
economy. Many countries were thus persua-
ded into abandoning the last bulwark of inde-
pendence in monetary policy; autonomy was 
traded in for the promise of investment, sup-
port from financial institutions, and growth. 
 
In trying to rectify the errors of the past –
which are of course dramatized by a debt cri-
sis- the state must in effect create a new coa-
lition at home at the same time as attaining a 
new equilibrium in its relations with the world 
of international finance. The key problem he-
re, and thus the essence of the current dilem-
ma for the state in the developing world, is 
that the autonomy expected from each side is 
radically different: whereas domestic interests 
expect free use of economic policy levers to 
compensate the woes of unemployment, low 
wages and poverty, foreign creditors expect 
the state to act independently from democratic 
pressures (as in the era of the “gold standard”) 
so that it can honour its financial obligations.  
 
Using the concepts introduced in chapter 3, 
we should say that a certain “coercive” autono-
my is sought by creditors, and an “embedded” 
autonomy by domestic interests. The “conver-
ged” state is a model of precisely the autonomy 
that financial markets require77, whereas do-
mestic interests insist on no more than an au-
thentic nation-state, acting in the interests of 
the general public. It is perhaps no coinciden-
ce that the IMF and markets’ favourite in the 
2004 Indonesian elections, the eventual victor 
Yudhoyono, has portrayed himself as a strong-
man, able to “make the international commu-
nity comfortable”78. 
 
                                                          
76  The exceptions to the latter – notably Argentina from 1991 to 
2001- have tended to be those countries that have wished to in-
sulate economic policy (and avoid inflation) by making it im-
possible for democratically elected governments to interfere 
with the money supply 
77  And not just the market. Certain conservative analysts agree 
that democracy in the developing world is no panacea, and 
should be restricted in particular circumstances. See Zakaria, 
2004. 
78  In “Democracy has taken root – but voters still hanker after a 
strongman leader,” Financial Times, 5/7/2004. 
Indebted democratic states in the developing 
world are thus constantly being forced to 
adopt different stances and navigate between 
two very different discourses in an attempt to 
reconcile the need to service debt and the need 
to serve the public. It is only to be expected 
that this oscillation in state autonomy produ-
ces high public expectations, an excessive bur-
den of foreign pressure, and great fragility in 
the political system. It is also natural that after 
a major debt crisis, marked by sharply decli-
ning living standards and widespread public 
discontent, the state in the affected country 
will seek to redesign its working conditions 
both at home and abroad, establishing a novel 
approach to government at home and a new 
deal in its relations with the world of interna-
tional finance and the global economy. Per-
haps most importantly, as we have discussed, 
this sort of crisis hands certain countries the 
tools needed to achieve such a new settlement. 
 
 
 
5.2. SOVEREIGNTY AND GLOBAL POWER 
 
In light of these developments, we can reframe 
the issue by considering how a state’s sove-
reignty is affected. Is there an inevitable trend 
toward “negative” sovereignty, or can some 
new sort of “positive sovereignty” be attained 
in developing countries, allowing the state mo-
re substantial freedom in the policies it choo-
ses to implement? Does the international debt 
regime and global economic integration neces-
sarily impose a “golden straightjacket” (quoted 
in Rodrik, 2002; p. 14), and require that de-
mocratic politics and nation-state systems be 
progressively narrowed and debilitated? 
 
The study of debt-affected countries in the 
preceding chapters would suggest that only 
provisional conclusions can be given to these 
questions. Certain states can hold off foreign 
creditors’ demands, and can undergo renewal 
in legitimacy and autonomy. Yet this will tend 
to occur in an environment of weakened au-
thority, economic uncertainty and popular dis-
content: inevitably, the state becomes a contes-
ted site, in which political leaders seek out 
new bases of support and undertake changes 
in the governing ideology. 
 
One way to conceptualise the new dynamics in 
state sovereignty is to explore the basic sys-
tems of global power in the modern world – as 
applied by states, multilateral institutions and 
non-governmental bodies- and the manner in 
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which foreign debt is treated and interpreted 
by each system. Following on from the work 
of John Boli (in Krassner (ed), 2001), we may 
divide the operations and objectives of the 
world political system at present into three 
broad categories: 
 
1. Liberal economic order. This includes 
the major lending bodies, both public 
and private, and the regulated system of 
free trade. Its fundamental ideology is 
one of increasing global welfare through 
a legally-defined system of free-market 
activity and reciprocal payment obliga-
tions. 
 
2. World citizenship. Encapsulated in the 
Millennium Development Goals, and 
supported by the UN system as a whole, 
this power system emphasizes the attain-
ment of certain welfare objectives due to 
their moral significance and their benefi-
cial effect on humankind. 
 
3. Nation-states. Here the stress is placed 
on the rights and entitlements of highly 
institutionalised, spatially-defined politi-
cal units, which are taken to represent 
and act on behalf of the interests of the 
people who live in a given territory. 
 
Debt, of course, is a critical issue for all three 
systems. For the first, it is a necessary and legi-
timate component of international economic 
relations; debt defaults only serve to impede 
the normal fluidity of such relations due to the 
rupture they entail in reciprocal obligations. 
The second regards heavy debt burdens as a 
threat to public welfare, state budgets and eco-
nomic growth; this harm evokes fierce moral 
condemnation when countries with low levels 
of development are obliged to engage in exces-
sive debt servicing. But in the third case, that 
of the nation-state system, debt is essentially 
regarded as a transaction that must be carried 
out between the citizenry and the global eco-
nomic order; states may seek to play one a-
gainst the other (as we have seen in Africa and 
other cases), but in most cases they endeavour 
to balance the two sets of demands with a mi-
nimal loss of authority. 
 
As we have seen, this transactional role of the 
state enables it to secure a degree of legitimacy 
and autonomy even in the context of falling li-
ving standards. At the same time, however, the 
post-war vision of the state as an energizing 
and mobilizing force in its country’s economy 
and society – as the principal agent for deve-
lopment – appears to have been sidelined, both 
by dominant liberal ideology of the 1990s (en-
capsulated in the “Washington Consensus,” 
(Williamson, 2004)), and since then by the li-
mits on independent action and economic po-
licy that derive from a country’s insertion in 
the ever more interdependent global economy. 
 
As regards those nations affected by high levels 
of foreign debt, “positive sovereignty,” or the 
notion that a state can freely harness its inter-
national status and its domestic authority at 
one and the same time in its quest for econo-
mic and social development, is made yet more 
problematic by intense competition between 
domestic public demands and the require-
ments of international finance. Unable to at-
tain international financial support for the cau-
se of domestic welfare, the countries on view 
in this study have been forced to establish new 
approaches to demands laid upon them. Each 
country has learnt to depend on its diplomatic 
or economic strengths to gain some leeway. 
Each one has been highly cautious in its eco-
nomic policy, tying its hands either through 
accords with the IMF, or through its own self-
imposed financial discipline. And each appears 
to have decided that once the crisis is resolved, 
the terms of its engagement with the global 
economy and financial markets will have to al-
ter, so as to prevent any return to the volatility 
that proved so prevalent in the 1990s. 
 
This new sovereignty may not be “positive,” 
but it does manifest a classic transaction wit-
hin the terms of the concept. Unable to recon-
cile the different systems of world power as 
they operate today, the populous nation-state 
in the developing world appears to be seeking 
to transfer some of its free choice over domes-
tic policy, particularly economic policy, for an 
increase in “Westphalian sovereignty”: name-
ly, the exclusion of another country’s influence 
over domestic affairs. It is curious perhaps to 
consider that this new dynamic in relations 
between the poorer and richer segments of the 
globe stands in contrast to the process of inte-
gration within regional blocs such as the Euro-
pean Union, in which a loss in “Westphalian 
sovereignty” is tolerated for greater traction 
over domestic concerns. 
 
For the moment, these broad considerations 
remain in the realm of speculation. It is hard, 
as certain economists have argued (Bergsten, 
2005), to draw valid systemic conclusions 
from recent developments, and especially befo-
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re these new systems are tested by adverse glo-
bal economic conditions. The fact remains, ho-
wever, that the state in the developing world, 
left in recent years to resolve the contradic-
tions between global power systems, is on the 
quest for a new set of prerogatives in a hostile 
world. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Looking back over the last 60 years, the poli-
tical and economic changes in the developing 
world have been remarkable. This paper has 
attempted to give an insight into that trans-
formation by concentrating on one of its key 
aspects: the interrelations between these de-
veloping countries and the world of global fi-
nance. 
 
Initially regarded by development economists 
as a means to lift impoverished countries out 
of their chronic cycles of low saving and low 
investment, financial credit has progressively 
shifted in character in the last few decades. 
Bank loans and official development aid be-
gan to pale in the 1990s against the vast 
sums of private investment being deposited, 
albeit briefly, in certain major developing 
countries, in the obvious hope that investors 
could cash in on high rates of growth. 
 
Yet as was discussed in chapter 2, these cre-
dits depended for their existence upon an in-
formal structure of power, a rapid extension 
of market prerogatives after the end of the 
Cold War, and shifts in the collective senti-
ments of increasingly interconnected finan-
cial brokers; in combination, these could, 
and did, provoke a financial stampede out of 
developing countries. The authorities in the-
se countries, meanwhile, simply failed to un-
derstand -or preferred not to consider- the 
full consequences of taking on greater debt, 
especially when this debt depended on eco-
nomic variables quite beyond the govern-
ments’ control. The result, as witnessed a-
cross the developing world from 1997 to 
2002, was a series of crises causing grave 
economic damage to millions of people. 
 
It is rash, however, to conclude an account of 
debt and development at that juncture. The 
same countries that were three or four years 
ago in deep crisis, or said to be on the verge 
of collapse, now appear to be thriving econo-
mically. Their governments appear bold and 
decisive. In some cases, notably those of In-
donesia and Argentina, it might seem to an 
outside observer that financial collapse has 
even served the nations’ long-term interest. 
 
How can this be? This paper has sought to 
sketch some answers to this question by fo-
cusing on the political evolution of develo-
ping countries in recent decades, and in par-
ticular the effects of the creation of many 
new democracies in both developmental and 
corporatist states. The resulting public and 
electoral pressures on government, in turn, 
have stripped states of their former “autono-
my” in certain policy areas, not unlike the 
way insertion in the global market has limi-
ted governments’ economic freedom of ac-
tion. In extreme cases, such as the nations in 
the HIPC programme for heavily indebted 
countries, policy has simply been prescribed 
by the IMF and World Bank, causing govern-
ment officials to resist temporarily, cave in, 
or resort to a stance of semi-cooperative pas-
sivity. 
 
For more populous and powerful developing 
countries, on the other hand, the catastro-
phic loss of autonomy and legitimacy follo-
wing a major debt crisis can generate a tho-
rough reorientation of the state. Impoverish-
ment, mass distrust of authority and disdain 
for the ancien régime combine to generate 
new electoral majorities and political ideolo-
gies. The state, formerly trapped between the 
pressures of a discontented populace and the 
exigencies of financial markets, discovers a 
margin for manoeuvre; enough, at least, to 
strike out a new course, in which it endea-
vours to regain sovereignty by fiscal and mo-
netary self-discipline, or by spurning the cre-
dit relations and political alliances on which 
disgraced previous governments depended. 
 
We do not know at present the outcome of 
this process. It may be, as some economists 
have speculated, that favourable global eco-
nomic conditions have underwritten these 
rapid recoveries - and that, as yet, there is no 
durable alternative “model” for medium-si-
zed democracies but ever greater integration 
into financial markets and the global econo-
my. Yet it is also true that the decade of debt 
has proved a watershed for major developing 
countries, out of which a new set of priorities 
has been established, foremost among which 
is the importance of rebuilding an active and 
sovereign state. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table 1  
Total external debt of developing countries, 1997-2003 (billions of dollars) 
 
 
 1997 1999 2001 2003 
All developing 
countries 2,109.7 2,346.6 2,260.5 2,554.1 
East Asia & 
Pacific 526.3 538.6 502.0 525.5 
[Indonesia 136.2 151.2 134.0 134.4] 
East Europe 
& Central Asia  391.2 503.5 507.8 676.0 
Latin America 
& Caribbean 670.4 771.8 749.2 779.6 
[Argentina 128.4 145.8 154.1 166.2] 
Middle East & 
North Africa 151.3 155.8 142.1 158.8 
South Asia 149.6 162.0 156.2 182.8 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 220.8 215.0 203.2 231.4 
[Zambia 6.97 6.407 7.27 6.468] 
 
SOURCES: World Bank and IMF.   
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Total debt service as a percentage of GNI, 1975-2003
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